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REFORMING THE TAX INCENTIVES FOR HIGHER
EDUCATION
Camilla E. Watson*
Federal spending on higher education has long been controversial,
primarily because it has grown exponentially since the 1950s but it has
produced a system which many regard as too expensive and grossly
inefficient. The soaring costs are placing higher education beyond the reach
of many Americans, and of those who enter college, less than half complete
their degrees. Particular criticism has been directed toward the education
tax incentives, enacted mostly in the late 1990s, which shifted federalfunding
for higher education from direct benefits to students in the form of grants,
loans and work-study programs to indirect benefits through the tax system.
The crux of this criticism is that the tax incentives, in addition to being costly
and highly complex, have had virtually no effect on college enrollment and
retention. Congress has studied this problem for the past few years and has
several bills currently on the table to reform these incentives. There are other
proposals pending as well, such as those of President Obama and the
Education Consortium from the private sector. This article critiques these
various proposals and explains why they are not likely to achieve the desired
result of increasing college enrollment and retention, particularly among
lower-income individuals. The article suggests a reform of the education tax
incentives that is different from any of the current proposals and is more
likely to achieve the desired result in a simpler, fairer, and more efficient
manner.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During President Clinton's first term in office, college enrollment was
flat,' and less than a quarter of those aged twenty-five to twenty-nine held a
bachelor's degree or higher. 2 Since increasing direct spending for education
1 During the first term of the Clinton administration, college enrollment by recent high
school graduates actually decreased, albeit by an average of only 0.205% per year (from 1992
to 1993, enrollment decreased 1.26%; from 1993 to 1994, it decreased 0.18%; from 1994 to
1995, it decreased 0.12%; from 1995 to 1996, it increased 0.74%; from 1996 to 1997, it
increased 0.95%). See THOMAS D. SNYDER ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2014, at 426 tbl.303.10 (50th ed. 2014)
[hereinafter NCES DIGEST], http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2016/2016006.pdf. During the George
H.W. Bush administration, however, enrollment had increased 7% overall (representing an
average increase of 1.75% during each of his four years in office). See id. This difference will
be explored in more depth in Follow the Money: The Evolution and Inefficiency of Federal
Funding for Higher Education, (in progress). See infra note 22.
2 See NCES DIGEST, supra note 1, at 38 tbl.104.20 (23.2% held postsecondary degrees
in 1990; 24.7% held such degrees in 1995).
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was not politically feasible,3 early in Clinton's second term, federal funding
of higher education shifted from direct funding4 through grants, loans, and
work-study programs to indirect funding through the tax code.5 Today, the
federal government spends over $180 billion on higher education, of which
over $130 billion is spent via direct funding through grants and loans,6 around
$34 billion is spent indirectly through foregone revenue attributable to the
3 In 1995, during the third year of Clinton's presidency, the Democrats lost control of
Congress. See generally James P. Pfiffner, President Clinton, Newt Gingrich, and the 104th
Congress, in ON PARTIES: ESSAYS HONORING AUSTIN RANNEY 135 (Nelson W. Polsby &
Raymond E. Wolfinger eds., 2000) (discussing the relationship between President Clinton and
the Republican-controlled Congress). In the 104th Congress, for the first time since 1952, the
Republicans held a majority of the seats in both the House and the Senate. 104th Congress
Adjourns, CNN (Oct. 4, 1996,5:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/US/9610/04/congress/. In 1996,
Congress began to consider tax reform. The new Republican majority pushed for a cut in the
capital gains tax rate, while Clinton pushed for more tax breaks for the middle class,
particularly the lower middle class. See Ann Curley & John King, Senate Panel Settles On Tax
Cuts, CNN (June 20, 1997), http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/06/19/tax.clinton/
(discussing Clinton's opposition to specific capital gains proposals). The education tax
incentives represented the compromise position between a Democratic president and a
Republican Congress.
4 I refer to "direct funding" to mean financial aid that the federal government pays directly,
whether to the recipient or to the postsecondary institution on behalf of the student. This differs
from the government's definition of direct funding, which is loans and grants paid directly by the
federal government without the involvement of private lenders. See Federal Versus Private
Loans, studentaid.ed.gov, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans/federal-vs-private (last
visited Oct. 31,2016). The term "indirect funding" is used to connote foregone revenue from the
use of tax incentives, although this lost revenue represents real dollars in terms of the federal
budget. See infra note 33.
5 See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § § 201-203, 213,225, 111 Stat.
787, 799-809, 813-817, 820 (1997) (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 25A (Hope and
Lifetime Learning education tax credits)), 72(t) (penalty relief for early distribution from IRAs
used for purposes of education), 108(f) (exclusion for forgiveness of student loan debt for
those working in public interest jobs), 221 (deduction for interest on student loans), 530
(education savings accounts). The Act also extended the exclusion for employer-provided
education assistance under § 127 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). § 221, 11 Stat. at 818.
It is generally more politically expedient to obtain funding through tax expenditures than
through appropriations. See Bridget T. Long, The Impact of Federal Tax Credits for Higher
Education Expenses, in COLLEGE CHOICES: THE ECONOMICS OF WHERE TO Go, WHEN TO Go,
AND HOW TO PAY FOR IT 101, 102 (Caroline M. Hoxby ed., 2004) (noting that "federal budget
rules favor tax expenditures over discretionary spending programs").
6 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2016 117-18
tbl.29-1 (2015) [hereinafter 2016 BUDGET PERSPECTIVES]. The majority of this amount,
around $100 billion, is spent on student loans; over $32 billion is spent on grants, of which
Pell Grants constitute the majority ($31.5 billion), and around $1 billion is spent on grants to
colleges and universities. Id. See also Federal Student Aid, NEW AM. [hereinafter ATLAS
EDUCATION PROGRAMS OVERVIEW], https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/policy-
explainers/higher-ed-workforce/federal-student-aid/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
2017]
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tax incentives,7 and around $15 billion is spent directly in veterans'
educational assistance.
8
Commentators have criticized federal funding of higher education in
general and the tax incentives in particular9- even though the United States
spends more per student on education than any other country in the developed
world'°-because the quality of education and educational attainment have
fallen in the past fifteen years."1 Today, around half of students from middle-
7 2016 BUDGET PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 224-25 tbl.14-1. The largest of these
tax expenditures (around $15.6 billion) is attributable to the American Opportunity Tax Credit
(AOTC). Id. at 224. See also discussion infra note 24.
8 See COLL. BD.,TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2015, at 10 tbl.1 (2015). See also infra note
38.
9 See, e.g., JEREMIE GREER & EZRA LEVIN, CORP. FOR ENTER. DEV., UPSIDE DOWN:
HIGHER EDUCATION TAX SPENDING 1,3-5 (2014), http://cfed.org/assets/pdfs/UpsideDown_-
_HigherEducationTaxExpenditures.pdf (addressing problems with federal spending for
higher education in general); DAVID P. SMOLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43302,
POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION ISSUES IN THE 113TH CONGRESS 5-13 (2013),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43302.pdf (raising issues about postsecondary funding,
including its effect on college prices and institutional quality as well as education tax benefits
and whether they are "appropriately targeted and effective in achieving their intended
purposes"); Deborah H. Schenk & Andrew L. Grossman, The Failure of Tax Incentives for
Education, 61 TAX L. REV. 295 (2008) (addressing specific problems with the education tax
incentives).
10 James Marshall Crotty, Why Asian Nations Dominate Global Education Rankings,
FORBES (May 21, 2014, 3:48 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesmarshallcrotty/
2014/05/21/why-asian-nations-dominate-global-education-rankings/#2d867f6117c4.
11 In 1990, the United States was ranked first in the world in four-year degree
attainment; in 1995, it was second in rate of college completion, but it fell to twelfth in 2015.
See Federal Budget Tipsheet: Education Spending, NAT'L PRIORITIES PROJECT,
https://www.nationalpriorities.org/guides/tipsheet-education-spending/ (last visited Oct. 31,
2016); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION DEV. [OECD], EDUCATION AT A GLANCE 2013: OECD
INDICATORS (2013) [hereinafter OECD, EDUCATION AT A GLANCE]. There are various other
rankings that also confirm this decline. See, e.g., Sean Coughlan, Asia Tops Biggest Global
School Rankings, BBC NEWS (May 13, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32608772
(finding that the United States ranks twenty-eighth in math and science). But see The Learning
Curve Index, PEARSON (2016), http://www.thelearningcurve.pearson.com/index/index-
ranking (ranking the United States fourteenth in "cognitive skills and educational attainment"
in 2014; seventeenth in same category in 2012).
Based on a six-year completion rate beginning in 2007, only about half of those who
enrolled in college (59%) earned a degree. INST. OF EDUC. ScIs., THE CONDITION OF
EDUCATION 234-37 (2015), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator-ctr.asp. In 1995, the
United States was 12.6 points above the OECD average in college completion and tied for first
with New Zealand; in 2000, the United States was only 6.3 points above the OECD average,
while New Zealand remained first at 15.9 points above the United States; in 2003, the United
States was 1 point below the OECD average; and in 2008, it was 0.4 points below the average.
OECD, EDUCATION AT A GLANCE, supra note 11, at 63 tbl.A3.2a. The Obama administration
has cited this decline as the rationale for its "First In the World" competition for education
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and higher-income families who enroll in college complete their degrees by
age twenty-five, and this rate drops drastically for students from lower-
income families, for whom the completion rate is less than one-in-ten.
2
These dismal rates raise the specter of inefficiency in funding for education
and have led to several current proposals to reform federal spending on higher
education. Many of these proposals focus on education tax incentives
because they are low-hanging fruit; virtually everyone agrees that these
incentives collectively do not work well. 3
Both the House and the Senate have held hearings for the past several
years on reform of federal spending for higher education, with particular
emphasis on the tax incentives. In his opening statement during the Senate
Finance Committee hearing in 2012,14 Senator Orrin Hatch noted: "In
evaluating the education tax incentives, we use the same three factors that are
used in evaluating all tax incentives: equity, efficiency and simplicity.' ' 5
None of the witnesses who spoke during this hearing, however, thought that
the current incentives met any of those criteria,' 6 and they were not alone.
reform. See Higher Education, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/education/
higher-education (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
12 See The President's 2015 Budget Proposal for Education, U.S. DEP'T EDUC.,
http://www.ed.gov/budgetl5 (last visited Oct. 31, 2016). See Martha J. Bailey & Susan M.
Dynarski, Inequality in Postsecondary Education, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY: RISING
INEQUALITY, SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN'S LIFE CHANCES 117-132 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard
J. Murnane eds., 2011). This creates an "education gap" between lower-income and higher-
income individuals. This gap affects the economic opportunities of these individuals as well
as the competitiveness of the United States in the global economy. According to the League
of Women Voters, "dropouts cost the country at least $200 billion a year in lost wages and
taxes, costs for social services and crime. Since the 1980s, national investments have spent
three times more on the prison system than on education." The Role of the Federal Government
in Public Education: Equity and Funding, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS (2011), http://lwv.org/
content/role-federal-government-public-education-equity-and-funding.
13 See, e.g., Stuart Lazar, Schooling Congress: The Current Landscape of the Tax
Treatment of Higher Education Expenses and a Framework for Reform, 2010 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1047 (2010) (criticizing the Business Expense Deduction and Tax Incentives Provisions
in the Internal Revenue Code (Code)); Schenk & Grossman, supra note 9; Sean M. Stegmaier,
Tax Incentives for Higher Education in the Internal Revenue Code: Education Tax
Expenditure Reform and the Inclusion of Refundable Tax Credits, 37 Sw. U. L. REV. 135
(2008) (criticizing the tax incentives' complexity and inability to reach target taxpayers
effectively).
14 See Education Tax Incentives and Tax Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 112th Cong. (2012), http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/82271.pdf
[hereinafter 2012 S.Hrg.].
15 Id. at 4 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Member, S. Comm. on Fin.).
16 See id. (statements of Max Baucus, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.; Dr. Susan Dynarski,
Professor, University of Michigan, Faculty Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic
Research, and Research Associate, Center for Analysis of Postsecondary Education and
Employment; Scott A. Hodge, President, Tax Foundation; Lynne Munson, President and
2017]
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This general view has been summed up by Professor Michael Graetz: "The
education tax incentives represent the greatest increase in federal funding for
higher education since the GI Bill. But no one can tell you what they are, how
they work, or how they interact. Planning to pay for college around these tax
breaks is essentially impossible for middle-income families.""
The House and Senate hearings have culminated in several bills
currently under consideration by Congress. 8 While there is no clear
consensus on which proposal (or combination of proposals) will prevail, it is
clear that the education tax incentives will be reformed at some point in the
not too distant future. Since Congress cannot agree on the direction that the
reform should take, the questions remain: which of the conflicting political
ideologies will prevail, will there be any compromise, and will the ultimate
reform produce results that are fairer, simpler, and more efficient than the
current system? The overarching question is whether the federal investment
in education will produce results that can be justified to those who actually
bear the cost, i.e., the taxpayers.
The myriad proposals currently pending reflect, for the most part, the
underlying political ideologies of Congress. They range from drastic
cutbacks in spending for education' 9 to free community college. 20 While
these proposals share some common features, even these commonalities
21
work at cross-purposes with the goals of making federal spending and
student financial assistance for higher education simpler, fairer, and more
Executive Director, Common Core; James R. White and George A. Scott, U.S. Government
Accountability Office; Molly Corbett Broad, President, American Council on Education;
Michael Binder, Center for Fiscal Equity).
17 Michael J. Graetz, VAT As the Key to Real Tax Reform, in THE VAT READER: WHAT
A FEDERAL CONsuMPTION TAX WOULD MEAN FOR AMERICA 112, 119 (2011), quoted in 2012
S.Hrg., supra note 14, at 5.
18 See discussion infra notes 100-107, 111-165 and accompanying text.
19 See discussion infra notes 134-135, 143-151 and accompanying text.
20 See discussion infra notes 178-186 and accompanying text. The 2016 Democratic
presidential nominee, Hillary Clinton, also proposed to make college debt-free for those in
need, although her proposal was not quite as generous as the Obama proposal. For a brief
discussion of her proposal, see College Compact: Costs Won't Be a Barrier, HILLARY FOR AM.
(2016), https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/factsheets/2015/08/10/college-compact-
costs/.
21 "A purpose usually unintentionally contrary to another purpose of oneself or of
something or someone else." Definition of Cross-Purpose, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cross-purpose (last visited Oct. 31, 2016). "If two people or
groups are at cross purposes, they do not understand each other because they have different
intentions." Cross Purposes Meaning, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.cambridge.
org/dictionary/english/cross-purposes (last visited Oct. 31,2016). In the case of reforming the
tax incentives for higher education, however, the purposes are not unintentionally contrary.
Instead, they are intentionally contrary because the political ideologies are contrary, and thus,
they work at cross-purposes to each other.
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efficient. In fact, none of the proposals currently on the table is likely to be
much more effective overall than the present system, and some may even
exacerbate the system's complexity, unfairness, and inefficiency.
Meaningful reform of the education tax incentives cannot occur without
a clearly articulated goal and a rational method of attaining that goal. Thus,
Congress should consider reform of these incentives in the context of a
broader reform of federal funding for higher education.
This article is the first of a two-part examination of federal funding
policy for higher education .22 It focuses primarily on indirect federal funding
through the education tax incentives, critiques the current proposals, and
suggests alternatives for reform of these incentives.
II. THE EDUCATION TAX INCENTIVES
There are currently a jaw-dropping eighteen tax incentives (depending
upon how one counts them) to help students and their families pay the
spiraling costs of higher education.2 3 These run the full gamut of tax benefits:
exclusions, deductions, credits, and exemptions. They apply before (saving
for college), during (paying current college costs), and after college (paying
24student loans). The revenue cost of these incentives has increased every
22 The second article, tentatively entitled Follow the Money: The Evolution and
Inefficiency of Federal Funding for Higher Education; will trace federal funding from the
early 1950s through the first term of the Obama administration. It will analyze the effect that
the various changes in federal funding have had on enrollment and retention based on
ethnicity, gender, and income levels. The article also will examine the type of institution in
which these students have enrolled (i.e., two-year, four-year, public, private, for-profit, not-
for-profit), and how federal funding and other extraneous factors have affected enrollment and
retention levels at the various institutions.
" I.R.C. §§ 25A (Hope, American Opportunity and Lifetime Learning tax credits),
32(c)(3) (increasing the age limit to twenty-three for a full-time student as a qualifying child
under the Earned Income Tax Credit), 72(t)(2)(E) (excluding early IRA distributions used for
education from tax and penalty), 108(f) (excluding student loan forgiveness under specified
circumstances), 117(a) (excluding scholarships and fellowships), 117(d) (excluding tuition
reduction for employees of education institutions and their families), 127 (excluding employer-
provided educational assistance), 132(a)(3), (j)(8) (excluding certain work-related education
expenses paid by an employer), 134 (excluding veterans education and training expenses), 135
(excluding interest on education savings bonds), 152(c)(3) (creating the parental personal
exemption for full-time students under age twenty-four), 162 (allowing for the deduction of
work-related education expenses via Treas. Reg § 1.162-5(a) (as amended in 1967)), 221
(allowing for the deduction of student loan interest), 222 (allowing for the deduction of tuition
and fees), 529 (exempting qualified tuition programs), 530 (exempting Coverdell education
savings accounts), 2503(e)(2)(A) (exempting - from gift tax - tuition payments made directly
to an educational institution on behalf of a student). Usually, in discussing reform of these
incentives, I.R.C. §§ 132, 162, and 2503 are not mentioned, primarily because they have become
so ingrained in the tax code that no one talks of removing (or reforming) them.
24 See discussion supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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25year since the early 2000s, costing taxpayers billions of dollars. The cost of
these incentives regularly equals or exceeds spending for Pell Grants, the
26largest federal need-based postsecondary student grant program. These
incentives, however, have had only a slight effect overall on college
enrollment trends .27 Given the cost of education tax incentives, the meager
return on investment makes them a highly inefficient expenditure.
A. Advantages of the Incentives
Despite the myriad well-founded criticisms of the education tax
incentives, there are some advantages to providing federal funding through
tax benefits. First, it is politically more expedient to provide funds indirectly
through the tax code than to appropriate funds to students or educational
institutions directly through the budget. Tax incentives for education offer
something for everyone politically: tax cuts for Republicans; an increase in
25 This amount is estimated to be $37.1 billion in fiscal year 2016. See OFFICE OF MGMT.
& BUDGET, ExEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2017 230 tbl.14-1 (2016) [hereinafter 2017
BUDGET PERSPECTIVES]. This is more than the amount currently spent on Pell Grants. See
OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE FEDERAL STUDENT AID ANNUAL
REPORT FY 2015, at 7 (2016) [hereinafter FEDERAL STUDENT AID REPORT FY 2015], https://
www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/2015report/fsa-report.pdf. This represents an increase of
1,050% in the cost of tax incentives for education between 1995 and 2003. GREER & LEVIN,
supra note 9.
The highest amount, over $13 billion, will be spent on the American Opportunity Tax
Credit. 2017 BUDGET PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 230 tbl.14-1. The next four highest-cost
education tax incentives are the deductibility of charitable contributions for education ($5.2
billion), the parental personal exemption for students age nineteen or over ($4.4 billion), the
exclusion for scholarships and fellowships ($3.25 billion), and the Lifetime Learning Credit
($2.45 billion). Id.
26 GREER & LEVIN, supra note 9, at 1. Other educational assistance grants administered
by the federal government are Supplemental Education Opportunity Grants (grants from the
United States Department of Education directed to the educational institutions to award to
students based on need; these grants may supplement the Pell Grant), Iran and Afghanistan
Service Grants (need-based grants for children or wards of service members who died while
in service in Iran or Afghanistan after the events of 9/11), and TEACH grants (available for
those enrolled in higher education who agree to teach in an area of high need in a low-income
elementary or secondary school for at least four years). See Federal Student Grant Programs,
FED. STUDENT AID (July 2014), https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/federal-grant-
programs.pdf.
27 See George B. Bulman & Caroline M. Hoxby, The Returns to the Federal Tax Credits
for Higher Education 22-23, 30 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20833,
2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20833.pdf. During Clinton's two terms in office, college
enrollment by recent high school graduates increased by an average of only 0.88% per year
and most of that increase was attributable to his second term. See NCES DIGEST, supra note
1, at 426 tbl.303.10.
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access to higher education, particularly for minorities and the
underprivileged, for Democrats. President Clinton employed this tactic when
Congress enacted the education tax incentives in 1997.28 Second, a tax
incentive does not carry the stigma of a "government handout," even for
refundable credits, which equate to a tax refund. 29 Third, tax incentives for
education promote voluntary compliance by fostering favorable taxpayer
views of the tax system. If a taxpayer does not benefit directly, he or she may
benefit indirectly from the positive external benefits of an educated populace,
such as a stronger economy,3 ° a stronger democracy,3' a lower rate of crime,3 2
and even better health.33 Fourth, Pell Grants and federally subsidized loans34
28 Press Release, William J. Clinton, President, United States of America, Statement on
Signing the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (Aug. 5, 1997), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
?pid=54507.
29 Some, however, argue that refundable tax credits are a welfare system. For a
discussion of this debate, see Tami Luhby, Are Tax Credits Welfare?, CNN MONEY (Nov. 3,
2008, 8:25 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/10/31/news/economy/taxes-welfare/.
30 Not only do college graduates earn more than those without a higher degree, but as
Mark J. Mazur, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury, stated
while testifying before the Senate Finance Committee in 2014: "there are spillover benefits of
a highly skilled and educated workforce that enhance the productivity and wages of other
workers." Less Student Debt from the Start: What Role Should the Tax System Play?: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 113th Cong. 9 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 S.Hrg.] (statement of
Hon. Mark J. Mazur, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury).
31 Cf. Stephen Lurie, Highly Educated Countries Have Better Governments, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/03/highly-
educated-countries-have-better-governments/284273/ (finding a statistical correlation
between education levels and successful governments-and hypothesizing that education
makes for better voters-but arguing that a stronger democracy is "[not the] reason that more
educated societies make more accountable government.").
32 See, e.g., Lance Lochner & Enrico Moretti, The Effect of Education on Crime:
Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8605, 2001), http://www.nber.org/papers/w8605.pdf (finding a statistical
correlation between increased education and a reduction in crime - a one percent increase in
the high school completion rate of all men aged 20-60 in the U.S. could save the country as
much as $1.4 billion per year).
33 See Kyle C. Post, Higher Education Tax Incentives: Why Current Reform Is
Necessary, 23 S. L.J. 73, 76 (2013) ("[T]hose with more education are less likely to smoke,
'drink a lot,' be overweight, or use illegal drugs and are more likely to exercise and obtain
preventive care."). Other examples of positive externalities are less reliance on government
benefits, greater civic participation, a more literate electorate, more inclination to volunteer,
greater parental involvement in children's education, and more scientific breakthroughs and
innovative companies. See 2014 S.Hrg., supra note 30, at 85 (statement of Mark J. Mazur,
Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury); 2012 S.Hrg., supra note
14, at 33 (statement of Sen. Max Baucus, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.).
34 Loans, OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/
sa/types/loans (last visited Oct. 31, 2016). Perkins loans and subsidized Stafford loans are low-
interest loans available to needy students. Id. Subsidized Stafford loans (as well as subsidized
2017]
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are available to lower-income students on the basis of means-tested need.
Still, there are students from middle-income families who cannot meet the
means test and are not eligible for Pell Grants or subsidized loans, but
nevertheless they may be in need of financial assistance. Because of this
inequity, tax incentives targeted to the middle class are efficient and fair.
B. General Disadvantages of the Incentives
Still, there are inherent problems with the incentives. The federal
government spends more than twenty percent of its support for postsecondary
education on them . In fiscal year 2013, this was more than $41 billion.36
Although the federal government delivers these benefits indirectly to
taxpayers through the tax code, this large amount of foregone revenue in fact
represents direct spending by the federal government. 37 This raises a related
problem, namely, that the cost of the incentives varies from year to year and
is thus not easily controllable. For instance, from 2008 to 2010 the amount of
education tax credits claimed increased markedly .3
Perkins and Direct Subsidized loans) are available only to undergraduate students and they
offer a deferral of both principal and interest while the student is enrolled in college at least
part-time and during the first six months (referred to as a grace period) following graduation.
Subsidized and Unsubsidized Loans, OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans/subsidized-unsubsidized (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
However, subsidized loans disbursed between July 1, 2012 and July 1,2014, will have interest
accrual during the grace period. Id.
35 In fiscal year 2014-2015, student loans encompassed 58.5% of federal aid for
education, grants encompassed 18.5%, and tax incentives encompassed 22.4%. See FEDERAL
STUDENT AID REPORT FY 2015, supra note 25, at 7; 2017 BUDGET PERSPECTIVES, supra note
25, at 230 tbl.14-1.
36 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2015 207 tbl.14.1
(2014) [hereinafter 2015 BUDGET PERSPECTIVES].
37 See discussion supra note 4. Stanley Surrey, the author of the tax expenditure theory,
explained that "tax credits, deductions, and exemptions are similar to direct governmental
expenditures because they provide special benefits to favored individuals and result in higher
tax rates for all other individuals." W. Edward Afield, Winning the Crowd: Harnessing
Taxpayer Choices to Improve Educational Quality, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 297,306 n.47 (2014).
38 See MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42561, THE
AMERICAN OPPORTUNITY TAX CREDIT: OVERVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND POLICY OPTIONS 7-8
(2016), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42561.pdf. This increase derived primarily from the fact
that more people enrolled in postsecondary institutions after the Great Recession of 2008
because they could not find jobs. The broader Pell Grant eligibility rules - plus the fact that
Congress enacted the American Opportunity Tax Credit (AOTC) as a temporary, refundable
credit in 2009 - also contributed to this enrollment increase. See Pell Grant Funding and
History, NEW AM. [hereinafter Pell Grant Overview], https://www.newamerica.org/education-
policy / policy- explainers/ higher- ed- workforce/ federal- student- aid/ federal- pell-
grants/pell-grant-funding/ (last visited Oct. 31,2016).
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Congress has raised questions not only about the cost of these incentives
and whether that cost is justified, but also about whether the federal
government should provide incentives for education through the tax code,
rather than through direct, targeted financial assistance.39 The argument in
favor of tax incentives is that they "reflect Americans' values" about
40
education . Since the federal government provides incentives through the tax
code to influence other fundamental decisions, such as whether to marry,
divorce, have children, work, establish a retirement plan, etc., it makes good
sense for the federal government to provide tax incentives to encourage the
pursuit of higher education.
Nevertheless, drawbacks remain. When the federal government
administrates education policy through the tax code, it not only makes the
Code more complicated and increases compliance costs for taxpayers, but it
also increases the likelihood that the intended beneficiary will not receive the
benefit.41  Additionally, the Internal Revenue Service (Service), an
overburdened and underfunded agency, must administer the tax incentives.
The chance of undetected fraud therefore remains high 42 and it grows when
multiple government entities oversee funding for a single federal program.43
Commentators criticize the education tax incentives on three general
grounds .4 First, they may actually increase tuition costs, thus negating the
39 See, e.g., STAFF OF S. FIN. COMM., 113TH CONG., TAX REFORM OPTIONS FOR
DISCUSSION 3, 12 (Comm. Print 2013).
40 See id. at 1.
41 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N, 114TH CONG., JCX-49-15, COMPLEXITY IN THE
FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM 15-16 (Comm. Print 2015) (discussing some of the adverse effects of
complexity of federal tax laws on taxpayers).
42 In addition to the AOTC, the tax code contains a number of other refundable credits,
such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Child Tax Credit and the Affordable Care Act.
Some postulate that the erroneous application of education credits contributes to the tax gap.
See Letter from Jeffrey A. Porter, Chair, Am. Inst. of CPAs Tax Exec. Comm., to H. Comm.
on Ways and Means 4-5 (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.aicpa.org/Advocacy/Tax/Downloadable
Documents/AICPA%20 Comment%20 Letter-%20 Education% 20HR%203393%20AOTC%
203-27-14.pdf (highlighting the 2011 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
(TIGTA) report and noting that "over four years, erroneous education credits could potentially
reach $12.8 billion").
43 Four Departments administer federal assistance for higher education: the Department
of Education, which administers loans, grants, and work-study programs provided through
Title IV of the Higher Education Act; the Internal Revenue Service (Service), which
administers the education tax incentives; the Department of Veterans Affairs, which
administers the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, as well as other
programs for veterans, service members, and their dependents; and the Department of Defense,
which provides tuition assistance to current service members.
44 In addition to the general criticism, others express concern about the unfair tax
advantages that such incentives provide to higher education institutions. Specifically, Sen.
Charles Grassley has expressed concern that while higher education institutions remain tax-
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benefit of the incentive, because institutions may "capture" the amount of the
tax credit by raising tuition.45 Second, they do not provide sufficient
inducement for lower- and middle-income taxpayers to enroll in postsecondary
institutions because of their complexity and the mismatch in timing between
paying for tuition and obtaining the tax benefit.4 6 Third, they are poorly
targeted because they simply provide a tax break for higher-income taxpayers
whose children would have enrolled in college regardless of the tax
incentives .4
1. Do Subsidies Lead to Increased Tuition Costs?
Widespread concern persists over the rising cost of college tuition,
which has outpaced both inflation and the cost of health care.48 Some of the
concern centers on whether federal funding for education is one of the factors
that has led to the skyrocketing cost of college tuition and whether the tax
incentives create a "higher education bubble" by encouraging students to
49
assume more debt than they feasibly will be able to repay.
William Bennett, Secretary of Education under President Reagan,
famously speculated that colleges captured federal financial aid by increasing
exempt, the federal government permits them to raise capital through tax-deductible charitable
contributions and through the issuance of tax-exempt bonds. See William Hoffman, Senate
Finance Considers Future of Education Tax Incentives, 136 TAx NOTES 512 (July 30, 2012).
45 See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
46 See discussion infra Part II.B.2. This mismatch may be as long as fifteen months
because tuition due in January will not trigger the AOTC until April of the following year,
when the taxpayer files his or her tax return. Even if the taxpayer files early, there will still be
a lag period of a month or two between the time the taxpayer files the return and when the
refund arrives the following year. See Schenk & Grossman, supra note 9, at 353-54.
47 See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
48 See Kim Clark, College Board Says Tuition Rose Faster Than Inflation Again This
Year, TIME (Nov. 4, 2015), http://time.com/money/4098683/college-board-tuition-cost-rose-
inflation-2015/; Danielle Kurtzleben, Charts: Just How Fast Has College Tuition Grown?,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 23, 2013, 3:56 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2013/10/23/charts-just-how-fast-has-college-tuition-grown (noting that growth in college
tuition costs has been nearly twice as fast as costs in medical care); COLL. BD., TRENDS IN
COLLEGE PRICING 2015, at 16-17 (2015), https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/
trends-college-pricing-web-final-508-2.pdf; see also STAFF OF S. FIN. COMM., I 13TH CONG.,
TAX REFORM OPTIONS FOR DISCUSSION 3 (Comm. Print 2013) (noting that college tuition and
fees have outpaced "the growth of real estate during the housing bubble").
49 See, e.g., 2014 S.Hrg., supra note 30, at 4 (opening statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch,
Member, S. Comm. on Fin.); id. at 16-17 (testimony of Scott A. Hodge, President, Tax
Foundation).
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tuition.50 This has become known as "the Bennett hypothesis." 51 Still, despite
exhaustive studies to prove the hypothesis, the data remain inconclusive. 52
Studies that support the hypothesis have received criticism for using flawed
assumptions.53 Conservative members of Congress, along with others,
however, continue to tout the hypothesis as fact.54 This is a prime example of
50 William J. Bennett, Opinion, Our Greedy Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1987, at
A31.
51 David L. Warren, Why Student Aid Is Not Driving Up College Costs, WASH. POST
(June 1, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/post/the-urban-legend-
of-the-bennett- hypothesis-or-why-student-aid-is-not-driving-up-college-costs/2012/05/31/gJ
QAFvEX5U-blog.html.
52 Some studies lend credence to the hypothesis. See, e.g., DAVID 0. LUCCA ET AL., FED.
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT No. 733, CREDIT SUPPLY AND THE RISE IN COLLEGE
TUITION: EVIDENCE FROM THE EXPANSION IN FEDERAL STUDENT AID PROGRAMS 3 (2015)
(concluding that while student aid programs increase access to postsecondary education, Pell
Grants and subsidized loans increase tuition sticker price by around forty and sixty cents on
the dollar, respectively); Nicholas Turner, Who Benefits from Student Aid? The Economic
Incidence of Tax-Based Federal Student Aid, 31 ECON. EDUC. REV. 463 (2012); see also
Megan McArdle, Megan McArdle on the Coming Burst of the College Bubble, NEWSWEEK
(Sept. 17, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/megan-mcardle-coming-burst-
college-bubble-64671; Christopher Lau, The Incidence of Federal Subsidies in For-profit
Higher Education 37-38 (Nov. 17, 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern
University), http://gradstudents.wcas.northwestern.edu/-cvl901/lau.jmp.pdf.) (showing that
"57% of federal grant aid and 51% of federal loan aid is passed on to for-profit colleges").
Other studies, however, refute it. See, e.g., DONALD E. HELLER, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., DOES
FEDERAL FINANCIAL AID DRIVE UP COLLEGE PRICES? 18 (Apr. 2013) (concluding that "the
process involves far too many variables for it to be essentially explained by the simplistic
notion that tuition-setting boards sit around and say, '[w]ell, Pell Grants are going up $200
next year, so we can raise tuition $100."'); ALISA F. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, STUDY OF COLLEGE COSTS AND PRICES, 1988-89 TO 1997-98, at 99-102,
133 (2001) (showing that increases in federal financial aid had no impact on tuition at either
public or private non-profit institutions); Warren, supra note 51 (pointing to various studies
from "15 years of federal research" that show "no link between student aid and tuition
increases").
53 See, e.g., Rising Costs of Higher Education and Tax Policy: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means Subcomm. on Oversight, 114th Cong. 2-3 (2015) [hereinafter H.
Oversight Hrg.] (statement of Terry W. Hartle, Senior Vice-President, American Council on
Education) (criticizing a recent Federal Reserve Bank of New York study on the grounds that
it considered only published price, rather than net price; tuition is not a factor in the
determination of the amount of an individual's Pell Grant, but the study considered only Pell
Grants and Stafford loans, and not other factors that have an influence on the price, such as
state support and institutional aid).
54 See, e.g., 2014 S.Hrg., supra note 30, at 5 (opening statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch,
Member, S. Comm. on Fin.) (stating with respect to the Bennett hypothesis: "I do not think
anybody can deny that he was right."); 2014 S.Hrg., supra note 30, at 16 (statement of Scott
A. Hodge, President, Tax Foundation) (discussing how education tax credits cause colleges to
increase their tuition); H. BUDGET COMM., 113TH CONG., EXPANDING OPPORTUNITY IN
AMERICA, DISCUSSION DRAFT 44 (July 24, 2014) ("[T]here is growing evidence that these
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how political ideologies work at cross-purposes to what should be the
common goal of promoting a more educated populace.
55
Critics of the Bennett hypothesis argue that it remains impossible to tell
whether federal assistance increases the cost of higher education because
various factors contribute to the rising costs .56 For instance, states have cut their
funding for education since the early 1980s, with the steepest cuts occurring
after the Great Recession of 2008.57 In addition, at both private and public
institutions, the recessions of 2001 and 2008 shrunk endowments and resulted
in decreased donations. 58 In response to these cuts, public institutions have
been forced to raise tuition59 with noticeable effect, since over seventy percent
of all college students attend public institutions. At research institutions,
tuition has increased to pay for expensive labs and other accouterments of
research that do not generate alternate income streams to offset their costs.
6 1
Furthermore, postsecondary institutions are not only human resource
federal subsidies are actually fueling tuition inflation.").
55 Those who tout this hypothesis as fact, in the face of overwhelming evidence to'the
contrary, do not focus on a goal of an educated populace, but instead focus on "the economic
effects of trading the elimination of these tax credits for lower tax rates for all Americans."
2014 S.Hrg., supra note 30, at 16 (statement of Scott A. Hodge, President, Tax Foundation).
English professor Christopher Newfield, in his book UNMAKING THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY,
"posits that conservative elites have worked to de-fund higher education explicitly because of
its function in creating a more empowered, democratic, and multiracial middle class." Anna
Victoria, Higher Education and Student Debt: Why Is Education So Expensive?, PLUCK
MAGAZINE (Jan. 2012), http://pluckmagazine.com/debt/articles/article-victoria_01 .php.
56 Some evidence exists, however, that prices at for-profit schools increase when the
amount of the Pell Grant increases. See 2012 S.Hrg., supra note 14, at 11,44 (statement of Dr.
Susan Dynarski, Professor, University of Michigan, Faculty Research Associate, National
Bureau of Economic Research, and Research Associate, Center for Analysis of Postsecondary
Education and Employment).
57 See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., FEDERAL AND STATE FUNDING OF HIGHER EDUCATION
4 (2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2015/06/federalstate-funding-higher_
education final.pdf.
58 Id. Over the past decade, published tuition at public, four-year institutions grew by an
average of 42%, but net tuition grew by 32%. At private, non-profit institutions, published tuition
grew by 24%, but the average net price decreased by 13%. See H. Oversight Hrg., supra note 53,
at 2 (statement of Terry W. Hartle, Senior Vice President, American Council on Education).
The lower amount of net tuition is attributable, in large part, to institutional grant aid, which has
already doubled over the past decade from $25.2 billion in 2003-2004 to $48.2 billion in 2013-
2014. See H. Oversight Hrg., supra note 53, at 2 (statement of Terry W. Hartle, Senior Vice
President, American Council on Education). See infra note 64.
59 See Victoria, supra note 55. According to Terry W. Hartle, not only has state support
for education fallen by 29% since 1998, but "a 1 percent decrease in state appropriations can
result in a 3-5 percent increase in tuition." H. Oversight Hrg., supra note 53, at 3 (statement
of Terry W. Hartle, Senior Vice President, American Council on Education).
60 See NCES DIGEST, supra note 1, at 426 tbl.303.10.
61 Victoria, supra note 55.
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intensive, but that resource must be highly educated and well-trained. In order
to attract and retain such talent, institutions must pay competitive wages,
including benefits, the costs of which have increased sharply in recent years.62
A cut in full-time faculty or an increase in class size is not only unpopular with
students, but those changes can also detrimentally affect both academic
quality63 and the length of time it takes students to complete their education,
which increases costs for students in the long run.
Moreover, in the past twenty to thirty years, there have been enormous
strides in technology. Postsecondary institutions must keep pace with these
advances, not only because students demand it, but also because technology
has become a part of both the education process and its delivery system.
64
This involves a huge cost and investment in infrastructure, staff, data
security, and other ongoing expenses.
Finally, postsecondary institutions have had to increase staff to fulfill the
federal regulatory requirements that accompany federal financial assistance.
One school estimates that about seven percent of its operating budget is65
attributable to costs associated with federal regulations. College officials state
that many of these regulations are "unnecessarily burdensome and duplicative"
and do not provide "meaningful benefits.66
In considering the rising costs of higher education, there are several factors
to bear in mind. First, only about twenty-five percent of students pay the
"sticker" price of tuition.67 Second, increases in the costs of higher education
62 See H. Oversight Hrg., supra note 53, at 5 (statement of Terry W. Hartle, Senior Vice
President, American Council on Education). Benefit expenses currently account for about 25%
of total human resource costs. Id.
63 id.
64 According to a statement of the American Council on Education: "This is evidenced
by the rising use of wireless classrooms, lecture capture and podcasting, mobile apps, and e-
portfolios .... No one wants colleges and universities to be equipped with scientific and
technology resources from 2000 as they try to meet the needs of students in 2014 and beyond."
2014 S.Hrg., supra note 30, at 118.
65 H. Oversight Hrg., supra note 53, at 6 (statement of Terry W. Hartle, Senior Vice
President, American Council on Education). Most of these regulations emanate from the U.S.
Department of Education. Id.
66 id.
67 One determines the tuition price paid by calculating what it costs the institution to
provide the education, less subsidies. Subsidies can consist of "state funding, financial aid,
endowment earnings, gifts from alumni and friends, and auxiliary enterprises such as college
bookstores." Id. at 2. According to a recent study, the gap between the sticker price and the
net price that students pay has widened. Tuition Discounts at Private Colleges Continue to
Climb, NAT'L ASS'N. OF COLL. AND UNIV. Bus. OFFICERS (May 16,2016), http://www.nacubo.
org/About NACUBO/Press Room/2015_TuitionDiscountingStudy.html (estimating that
the average institutional discount rate for academic year 2015-16 is 48.6% for first-time, full-
time freshmen and 42.5% for all undergraduates).
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are felt more sharply today because the median household income has fallen
since 2008 -it is now at roughly the same level as in 1995.68 Similarly, family
net worth has fallen with stock market volatility .69 Finally, the overall increase
in college tuition is skewed by the price of tuition at for-profit institutions,
which far outpaces tuition prices at public, non-profit institutions. 70 The
majority of students who default on their loans attend for-profit institutions and
are unable to find jobs after graduation that pay sufficient incomes to enable
them to repay their student loans .71 Another cohort of student loan defaulters
are those who, whether attending a for-profit or a non-profit institution,
dropped out before completing their degrees .72
2. Complexity & Mismatch in Timing
The sheer number of education tax incentives is daunting and clearly
indicates the complexity of these incentives. This complexity raises its own
set of problems. First, it increases compliance costs. 73 The incentives offer
every type of tax benefit- exclusions, exemptions, deductions, and credits-
but not all of these benefits are equal. An exclusion never appears on an
income tax return, so there is little to no compliance cost involved. In order
to benefit from a deduction or credit, however, an individual must file a tax
return v. Thus, the partially refundable AOTC requires filing a return and
68 See H. Oversight Hrg., supra note 53, at 6 (statement of Mary Francis McCourt,
Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Indiana University, on behalf of the
National Association of College and University Business Officers).
69 Id.
70 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, AND PENSIONS, 112TH CONG., FOR
PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND
ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS 36 (Comm. Print 2012), http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media!
for-profit report/Partl-PartIII-SelectedAppendixes.pdf.
71 See Michael Stratford, Pointing a Finger at For-Profits, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Sept.
11, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/09/11/study-finds-profit-colleges-
drove-spike-student-loan-defaults.
72 See, e.g., Kevin James, Avoid Debt by Degrees, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 7,2015,
11:40 AM) http://www.usnews.com/opinion/knowledge-bank/2015/07/07/student-debt-story-
needs-to-not-leave-out-graduation-rates. But see Warren, supra note 51 (noting that the default
rate of private-college student borrowers was the lowest of any sector).
73 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N, 114TH CONG., JCX-49-15, COMPLEXITY IN THE FEDERAL
TAX SYSTEM 15-16 (Comm. Print 2015) (discussing some of the adverse effects of complexity
of federal tax laws on taxpayers).
74 Another fundamental difference between an exclusion and a deduction or a credit is
that an exclusion represents a nontaxable receipt of an economic benefit, while a deduction or
credit involves a payment (i.e., an economic detriment). In order to benefit from an education
tax incentive that is a deduction or credit, the taxpayer must pay a "qualified education
expense" out of his or her own funds or those given to the taxpayer as a gift. A "qualified
education expense" does not include amounts paid with Pell Grants or other nontaxable grants,
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keeping records, which will increase compliance costs as well as the potential
for fraud .75
Second, sixteen of the eighteen incentives are designed to encourage
enrollment by students from lower- and middle-income families. These
incentives have different income limitations and apply to different
educational costs-with some being more liberal than others-and they offer
different benefits. They also are mutually exclusive, so a choice of one
incentive requires a reduction in the amount of "qualifying tuition and fees"
that may be considered for any other incentive. This reduces a taxpayer's
eligibility to use a different incentive that could produce greater tax savings.76
Thus, choosing the right tax incentive for individualized situations is a
scholarships, or fellowships.
Stated differently, when the taxpayer receives an economic benefit, such as a gift, scholarship,
or a Pell Grant, he or she does not have to pay taxes on that amount. When the taxpayer pays
a "qualified education expense" with those funds, it reduces the amount of qualified education
expenses available for other benefits, such as the refundable AOTC. If the taxpayer pays
qualified education expenses with amounts received as a gift, however, he or she gets the tax
benefit of the education tax incentive even though the gift (like the scholarship, fellowship, or
Pell Grant) is excludable from income tax.
In both cases, the taxpayers must present proof that they paid a qualified education expense
(with a Service Form 1098-T (Tuition Statement) obtained from the educational institution).
Taxpayers must also keep records and file tax returns in order to benefit. The difference is that
the gift recipients benefit twice: they get a tax-free gift as well as the education tax benefits.
The Pell Grant and scholarship recipients, however, only benefit once: they must pay a
qualified education expense in order to exclude the amount of the grant, fellowship, or
scholarship from income tax, and to the extent of that payment, it will remain ineligible for
any education tax benefit. See also infra note 138 and accompanying text.
75 In order to claim the AOTC, an individual must file a tax return with a Form 8863
(Education Credits) attached. In addition, the institution must issue a Form 1098-T (Tuition
Statement). There have been problems of confusion, particularly among part-time students,
erroneously claiming the credit and of institutions not submitting the Form 1098-T in a timely
manner. See CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 38, at 15-16. It is currently estimated that 45.3%
of American households pay no income tax. Roberton Williams, New Estimates of How Many
Households Pay No Federal Income Tax, FORBES (Oct. 6,2015, 11:19 PM) http://www.forbes.
com/sites/beltway/2015/10/ 06/ new- estimates- of- how- many- households- pay- no- federal-
income-tax. The problem with this estimate, however, is that it includes non-filers as well as
those who file but otherwise owe no tax. Some of the non-filers may have had taxes withheld,
but believe they are not required to file a return because they do not owe any further tax. Id.
One study estimated that the number of non-payers spiked to 51 % during the recession that
began in 2008. Chuck Marr & Chye-Ching Huyang, Misconceptions and Realities About Who
Pays Taxes, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/
research/misconceptions-and-realities-about-who-pays-taxes.
76 Another example of this kind of limitation is the inability to combine the AOTC and
Lifetime Learning Credit. The AOTC is available only for the first four years of postsecondary
education. If a taxpayer should take the Lifetime Learning Credit, which is a smaller credit but
is available for an unlimited number of years, the taxpayer's ability to take full advantage of
the larger AOTC from that point on would be limited. See also infra note 135.
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complicated process that could easily result in the wrong choice. That could
be particularly disadvantageous for lower- and middle-income families
because they could "leave money on the table" and not get the full tax
benefits to which they are entitled.77
Third, the income limitations may operate unfairly. In order to ensure
that the benefits are available only to lower- and middle-income taxpayers,
Congress provided phase-outs to reduce or eliminate the benefits based on
the taxpayer's income. These phase-outs are based on "modified adjusted
gross income" (mAGI), which is adjusted gross income with several items of
787
excludable income included. The arbitrariness of the income limitations,79
however, raises several problems. For one, there is no consideration of the
difference in cost of living in different localities . 80 For another, the use of the
mAGI allows no consideration of certain expenses that remain beyond the
control of the taxpayer but nevertheless affect the taxpayer's ability to pay
higher education costs. These expenses include things such as extraordinary
medical expenses, existing student loans, casualty losses, and the erosion of
savings or equity in times of recession.8' These financial detriments do not
affect the taxpayer's mAGI.8 2 Thus, the mAGI may reflect an income level
77 According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), "[They] found about
14% of filers (1.5 million of almost 11 million eligible returns) failed to claim a credit or
deduction for which they appear eligible." 2012 S.Hrg., supra note 14, at 14, 155 (statement
of James White, Director, Tax Issues, Government Accountability Office).
78 The definition of mAGI may vary among the provisions. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 25A(d)
(increasing the adjusted gross income by amounts excluded from income under §§ 911, 931,
or 933), 221(b)(2)(C) (determining adjusted gross income without regard to §§ 221, 199,222,
911,931 and 933, and after the application of §§ 86, 135, 137, 219 and 469).
79 See Schenk & Grossman, supra note 9, at 325 (noting the arbitrariness of the income
limitations).
80 The American Council on Education made this point. See Letter from Molly Corbett
Broad, President, Am. Council on Educ., to H. Ways and Means Comm. 3 (Apr. 4, 2014)
(noting that where one lives may affect the ability to claim education tax incentives and that
the reduced income phase-out limits exacerbate this discrepancy).
81 See Neal Gabler, The Secret Shame of Middle-Class Americans, THE ATLANTIC, May
2016, at 52-63 (detailing normal life choices that have led to devastating debt that, in turn, has
led to financial impotence, exemplified by the 71% of people polled by the Pew Charitable
Trusts who expressed concern about having enough money to cover day-to-day expenses).
Many of those who may have relied on home equity to finance their children's education have
found not only that it is harder to get a home-equity loan or to refinance, but also that their
equity has dropped considerably in the wake of the Great Recession of 2008. Id. at 57-58. In
addition, some parents may be saddled with their own student loans.
82 This is because the expenses mentioned are either itemized deductions (also called
"below-the-line" deductions under I.R.C. § 63(d)) that do not affect adjusted gross income,
I.R.C. § 62, or they are not deductible at all, as in the case of a reduction in value of an
investment portfolio, which is deductible as an investment loss only to the extent that there
has been a sale (i.e., a realization event) of any of the portfolio assets. I.R.C. § 1211.
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not indicative of the taxpayer's ability to pay the costs of higher education.
Moreover, the phase-outs have a built-in cliff effect, meaning that one dollar
of mAGI over the limitation amount will cause the taxpayer to lose the entire
deduction 83
On the other side of the coin, the definition of mAGI does not consider
the taxpayer's assets. A taxpayer could have a large amount of assets that do
not generate much taxable income. The taxpayer's mAGI may therefore be
low, but her ability to pay higher education expenses may be much higher
than her mAGI would indicate. A taxpayer's mAGI may also be artificially
low if she has significant investment deductions, such as depreciation or
depletion that would reduce her adjusted gross income.8 4 Taxpayers in both
cases may be considered higher-income from a financial standpoint, but each
would be entitled to an education tax credit if her mAGI were to fall below
the maximum phase-out amount.
Adding to the complexity is a persistent uncertainty about these
incentives, as some are slated to sunset at a future point.85 In the past,
Congress has extended some of these incentives at the eleventh hour and
eventually has made others permanent. 86 When Congress looks for ways to
cut the budget in the future, as it more than likely will at some point, the
education tax incentives may be a tempting place to start because of their
high cost.87 This makes long-term planning to pay the costs of higher
education difficult.
What is more, the education tax credits along with most of the other
education tax incentives only apply to tuition and related costs. They do not
83 As Schenk and Grossman observed, "A taxpayer with $160,000 of AGI could receive a
$2000 deduction for education expenses, which in a 25% tax bracket would produce tax savings
of $500. If, however, he had $160,001 AGI, he would receive no deduction. Thus, the additional
dollar in income produces a loss of $499." Schenk & Grossman, supra note 9, at 301.
84 See I.R.C. § 62(a)(4). Schenk and Grossman raise these points, supra note 9, at 328.
85 For example, Congress extended through December 31,2016 the deduction in section
222 of the Code for qualified tuition and related expenses, and the AOTC, which was
originally set to expire at the end of 2017, was made permanent under the Protecting
Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, §§ 102, 152, 129 Stat.
3040, 3044, 3066 (2015).
86 For example, Congress extended the exclusion of employer-provided educational
assistance under section 127 of the Code ten times before making it permanent under the
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013). Joanne
Sammer, Section 127 Tax-Free Education Benefits at Risk, SOC'Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT.
(Nov. 12, 2012), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/benefits/pages/section
127-educational-assistance.aspx.
87 At least one reformer suggests that Congress should eliminate the education credits in
favor of flattening tax rates for everyone. See 2012 S.Hrg., supra note 14, at 13, 135 (statement
of Scott A. Hodge, President, Tax Foundation). The reformer suggested it as a means of
simplifying the tax code and improving the economy. Id. at 133-35.
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apply to other major costs of postsecondary education, such as living
expenses, transportation, insurance, and nontuition related fees, which,
particularly at four-year institutions, may exceed the tuition costs.
88
Moreover, the benefits offered by the tax incentives generally are too small
to have a direct influence on the fundamental decisions of whether to attend
college, what type of institution to attend, and how long to attend, among
others.
89
The mismatch in timing between the obtainment of benefits from the tax
incentives and the payment of tuition exacerbates these problems. College
tuition generally is due in the summer or fall before attendance, but the
education tax incentives do not produce a benefit until the following year,
when the taxpayer files his or her tax return. This can result in a delay of up
to eight to ten months between the time the tuition is due and the taxpayer
receives the refund.90 In some cases, the delay takes as long as fifteen
months. 9' When there is a long delay, the taxpayer may consume the tax
benefit for personal use rather than use it for its intended purpose. The timing
mismatch also means that the tax benefits are not likely to have an effect on
the amount of a student's loan, which must be determined before the tuition
92payment is due.
The problems of complexity and the mismatch in timing between receipt
of the benefit and the payment of tuition makes the education tax incentives
highly inefficient.
3. Tax Breaks for Higher Income Taxpayers
The education tax incentives also are highly regressive because they
favor higher-income taxpayers over lower-income taxpayers. The greater the
tax bracket of the taxpayer, the greater the benefit. A tax benefit, whether a
deduction, exclusion or credit, is worth almost nothing to those who either
have no taxable income or who fall into the lowest income tax bracket.
President Obama alleviated some of this concern in 2009 with the partially
refundable AOTC, which allows a taxpayer with little to no taxable income
to obtain a partial refund.93 As one study noted, "tax provisions are best
88 As Schenk and Grossman note: "in most cases there is no financial assistance for other
costs, such as room and board, books, transportation, and other personal expenses and therefore
there will be significant, unmet financial need." Schenk & Grossman, supra note 9, at 317-18.
89 Id. at 324-25. An exception is a two-year community college with lower tuition. In
that case, the tax benefits, particularly the refundable AOTC, may be meaningful for a lower-
income taxpayer. Id. at 314.
90 See Schenk & Grossman, supra note 9, at 353-54.
91 See supra note 46.
92 See Long, supra note 5, at 132.
9' I.R.C. § 25A(i). Currently, 40% of this credit (up to $1000) is refundable. The AOTC,
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looked at as a means to transfer wealth. 94 This study concluded that the
education tax incentives, in general, remain unlikely to change behavior or
influence decisions-regardless of income-about whether or not to pursue
higher education.
95
Other inequities built into the tax incentives favor higher-income
families over lower-income families. For example, the AOTC and Lifetime
Learning credits are calculated on the basis of "qualified tuition and related
expenses. ' 96 These expenses must be reduced by any amount paid with tax-
free scholarships or Pell Grants.97 They are not reduced, however, by
amounts paid with gifts and inheritances.98 This is one of the few instances
in the tax code in which the taxpayer may "double dip" (i.e., gain a double
tax benefit).99 Since students who pay tuition and related expenses through
gifts and inheritances tend to be from higher-income families, this constitutes
an inherent bias against lower-income taxpayers.
III. CURRENT PROPOSALS
There has been no shortage of bills and other proposals to reform federal
spending for higher education, many of them focusing specifically on the
education tax incentives. The primary criterion in addressing the education
tax incentives under these proposals appears to be "use it or lose it": those
that taxpayers use more often (in that they represent a larger tax expenditure)
remain, with modifications, while those that are used less often must go.
The House Ways and Means Committee released a bill late in 2014,00
along with an ambitious "discussion draft," to rewrite the Code, including the
originally scheduled to expire in 2017, was made permanent under the Protecting Americans
fromTax Hikes (PATH) Act of2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 102, 129 Stat. 3040,3044 (2015).
94 Schenk & Grossman, supra note 9, at 365.
" Id. at 360-65. The incentives' ineffectiveness in encouraging greater enrollment and
retention by lower- and middle-income families has already been pointed out. See supra Part
II.B.2. Those in the higher-income levels would have pursued postsecondary education
without the tax incentives. Simply put, the tax benefit for them is a windfall. Schenk &
Grossman, supra note 9, at 364-65.
96 I.R.C. § 25A(f)(1). This definition includes only tuition and fees in the case of the
Lifetime Learning Credit, but for the AOTC it also includes course materials. Id. § 25A(i)(3).
97 See id. § 25A(g)(2); supra note 74.
9 I.R.C. § 25A(g)(2)(C).
99 This may even be a triple benefit because (1) the gift is not subject to income tax by the
recipient, id. § 102, (2) the gift, if paid as tuition directly to the educational institution, is free
from gift tax by the payor, id. § 2503(e)(2), and (3) despite being tax exempt, the amount of the
gift does not reduce the qualified tuition for purposes of determining the section 25A credits, id.
§ 25A(g)(2)(C).
100 Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. (2014).
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education tax incentives.' 0 ' It also held hearings in 2015 on The Rising Costs
of Higher Education and Tax Policy.102 The House Budget Committee also
released a discussion draft in 2014, which focused heavily on Pell Grants
0 3
The Senate Finance Committee held hearings on education tax reform in
2012,104 and again in 2014, on the role of the tax system in reducing student
debt. 10 5 While there has been no official proposal to date from the Senate
Finance Committee, Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) introduced a bill 0 6 on
which a working committee of the Senate Finance Committee commented.,
0 7
In addition, President Obama proposed his own changes to increase college
access,1 8 and a group called "Consortium for Higher Education Tax
Reform," 10 9 funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, released a
proposal. l °
101 H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 113TH CONG., TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014,
DISCUSSION DRAFT, SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY (2014). This draft aimed to rewrite the
Code yet achieve tax-neutral reform, in keeping with the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
102 H. Oversight Hrg., supra note 53.
103 H. BUDGET COMM., 1 13TH CONG., EXPANDING OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA, DISCUSSION
DRAFT 44 (2014).
104 See 2012 S.Hrg., supra note 14.
105 2014 S.Hrg., supra note 30.
06 American Opportunity Tax Credit Permanence and Consolidation Act of 2013, S. 835,
113th Cong. (2013). This bill relates to the Tax Reform Act of 2014. See Tax Reform Act of
2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. (2014). Other related bills also remain pending: Student and Family
Tax Simplification Act, H.R. 3393, 113th Cong. (2014); American Opportunity Tax Credit
Act of 2013, H.R. 1738, 113th Cong. (2013); Higher Education and Skills Obtainment Act, S.
1090, 113th Cong. (2013); College Affordability Act of 2013, H.R. 3437, 113th Cong. (2013);
Middle Class College Tuition Tax Credit Expansion Act, H.R. 3476, 113th Cong. (2013).
107 See S. COMM. ON FIN., 113TH CONG., THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX, BIPARTISAN TAX
WORKING GROUP REPORT 27-30 (2015), http://www.finance.senate.gov/download/the-
individual-tax-bipartisan-tax-working-group-report.
108 See Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Overview, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/overview (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) (proposing tuition-free community
college, strengthening Pell Grants, simplifying the federal application for student financial
assistance, and simplifying and expanding education tax benefits).
109 The Consortium consists of a partnership of four organizations: the Center for
Postsecondary and Economic Success at CLASP, Young Invincibles, the New America
Foundation's Education Policy Program, and The Education Trust. The Consortium remains
dedicated to reforming federal tax policy for higher education to increase access to college,
make college more affordable, and increase college completion rates by low and modest-
income individuals. CONSORTIUM FOR HIGHER EDUC. TAX REFORM, HIGHER EDUCATION TAX
REFORM: A SHARED AGENDA FOR INCREASING COLLEGE AFFORDABILITY, ACCESS AND
SUCCESS 5 (2013).
110 This proposal takes the form of a report. CONSORTIUM FOR HIGHER EDUC. TAX
REFORM, THE CONSORTIUM FOR HIGHER EDUCATION TAX REFORM REPORT (2014) [hereinafter
CONSORTIUM REPORT], http://www.clasp.org/resources-and-publications/publication-1/2014.
06.20-Consortium-for-Higher-Ed-Tax-Reform-FINAL.pdf. The author selected the
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A. House Proposals
1. Ways and Means Committee
The House Ways and Means Committee's proposal remains the most
comprehensive of the current proposals. Released in late 2014,111 its bill
proposes to repeal ten of the eighteen education tax incentives: 1 2 the Hope
Credit,"' the Lifetime Learning Credit,' 14 the American Opportunity
Credit,' 5 the exclusion of interest on U.S. savings bonds used to pay
qualified higher education expenses," 16 the deduction of interest on student
loans,' 7 the deduction of qualified tuition and related expenses," 8 new
contributions to Coverdell education savings accounts,"19 the exclusion of
discharge of certain student loan indebtedness,' the exclusion of qualified
121tuition reductions, the exclusion of employer provided educational
122assistance, and the exception to the ten percent penalty for early
distributions from retirement plans used to pay higher education expenses .123
The bill retains qualified tuition plans (QTPs) without modification.
Consortium Report for discussion because it advances a thoughtful proposal from the private
sector.
... See Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. (2014).
112 Id. at § 1201-1210. Note that the accompanying DISCUSSION DRAFT refers to a total
of "15 different tax benefits relating to education that often overlap with one another." H.
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 113TH CONG., TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014, DISCUSSION DRAFT,
SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY 8 (2014).
113 Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. § 1201 (2014) (proposing to amend
I.R.C. § 25A(a)-(b)).
114 Id. (proposing to amend I.R.C. § 25A(a), (c)).
115 Id. (proposing to amend I.R.C. § 25A(i)).
116 Id. § 1203 (proposing to repeal I.R.C. § 135).
117 Id. § 1204 (proposing to repeal I.R.C. § 221, along with its corresponding, favorable
above-the-line deduction-authorizing provision under I.R.C. § 6 2 (a)(17)).
''s Id. § 1205 (proposing to repeal I.R.C. § 222, along with its corresponding, favorable
above-the-line deduction-authorizing provision under I.R.C. § 62(a)(18)).
119 Id. § 1206 (proposing to amend I.R.C. § 530(b)(l)(A) so as to stop allowing new
contributions to Coverdell education savings accounts, but allowing rollovers to qualified
tuition plans under § 530(d)(5)).
120 Id. § 1207 (proposing to repeal I.R.C. § 108(f) along with corresponding provisions).
121 Id. § 1208 (proposing to repeal I.R.C. § 117(d) and amending conforming provisions).
122 Id. § 1209 (proposing to repeal I.R.C. § 127 and amending conforming provisions).
123 Id. § 1210 (proposing to repeal I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(E) and amending confirming
provisions).
124 See id. States and eligible educational institutions establish and maintain these plans,
as authorized under I.R.C. § 529. Two types exist: qualified tuition plans and qualified savings
plans. In a qualified tuition plan, the contributor pays into a plan maintained by an eligible
educational institution. When the beneficiary reaches college age and enrolls in that institution,
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These plans remain, by far, the most generous of the education tax incentive
savings plans. They place no limit on contributions and no tax on the
distribution, as long as the taxpayer uses the distribution for a qualified
education expense."' The QTP definition of qualified education expense
remains the broadest of any of the three tax incentive savings plans. It not
only includes tuition and related fees, but also books, supplies, equipment,
126computers and related expenses, and room and board. Although these plans
are used by approximately three-percent of taxpayers, most of these
taxpayers are higher-income families. 2 7 Thus, they carry political clout, and
128these plans hold a considerable amount of money. Under the House bill,
QTPs would be the only tax-favored college savings plan.
The bill replaces the ten repealed incentives with a single modified
AOTC 129 to provide an incentive for those currently in school. This new
AOTC would continue to provide a credit of up to $2500 against $4000 in
qualifying expenses, calculated as under the current AOTC. 130 The new
AOTC, like the current one, would continue to remain available for the first
four years of postsecondary education. 31 The definition of "qualified tuition
and related expenses" would expand to include not only tuition and fees, but
the institution issues a tuition waiver equal to the amount of the contributions, plus the tax-
free accumulation. If the beneficiary decides not to attend that institution, the contributor can
roll over the contribution and accumulation to another eligible institution. Eligible institutions
are those eligible to participate in student aid programs administered by the U.S. Department
of Education. These include public, private, non-profit, and proprietary institutions, as well as
vocational institutions. A qualified savings plan is also maintained by the state and works
basically the same as the qualified tuition plan, except that the taxpayer does not prepay tuition.
The tax consequences of the two remain the same- no tax on the accumulation and no tax on
the distribution, as long as the taxpayer uses the distribution for a qualified educational
purpose. See I.R.S. Pub. 970, Tax Benefits for Education 59-62 (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p970.pdf.
125 I.R.C. § 529(c).
126 Id. § 529(e)(3). Congress added computers and related equipment, software, and
services as qualified education expenses under the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes
(PATH) Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 302, 129 Stat. 3040, 3086 (2015).
127 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-64, HIGHER EDUCATION: A SMALL
PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES SAVE IN 529 PLANS 14-15 (2012). According to the report, the
majority of these contributors earn over $250,000. Id. at 15 n.39.
128 Approximately 11 million QTP accounts exist, with assets of around $232 billion.
Bernice Napach, 529 Plans: The College Savings Tool Most Families Don't Know About,
THINKADVISOR (May 28, 2015), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2015/05/28/529-plans-the-
college-savings-tool-most-families-d?slreturn=1473524326.
129 Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, ll3th Cong. § 1201 (2014).
130 Id. (proposed I.R.C. § 25A(a)). The $2500 credit is calculated by considering 100%
of the first $2000 in qualified tuition and related expenses, plus 25% of such expenses paid
that exceed $2000 but do not exceed $4000. Id.
131 Id. (proposed I.R.C. § 25A(d)).
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also course materials. 3 2 The new credit would increase the refundable
amount from forty percent to sixty percent (from $1000 to $1500),' 3
although it would lower the income limitations to almost half their present
values. 34
The lower phase-out limits of this bill would mean that fewer families
would benefit from the credit. Also, the repeal of the Lifetime Learning
Credit and the failure to extend the new AOTC beyond the first four years of
postsecondary education would mean that graduate and professional students
generally would not be able to take advantage of any education tax credit,
regardless of their income levels. 35
The House Ways and Means proposal also addresses Pell Grants. Two
problems persist with respect to such grants, both of which the proposal
addresses. First, Pell Grants remain excludable from income if the taxpayer
uses them for "qualifying tuition and related expenses."' 36 The definition of
qualifying tuition and related expenses, however, does not include room and
board (although there is no restriction on the grant itself that precludes the
student from using it for room and board).137 If the student uses any portion
of his or her Pell Grant for room and board, that portion will be taxable.
Second, spending Pell Grant funds on qualified tuition and related expenses
reduces the amount of these expenses that may be considered for the AOTC,
as well as for any other education tax incentive.138 Thus, the neediest students
(and other scholarship recipients) face a catch-22: they may either designate
132 Id. (proposed I.R.C. § 25A(e)(2)).
133 Id. (proposed I.R.C. § 25A(b)).
134 The income limitations are based on mAGI, defined as "the adjusted gross income of
the taxpayer for the taxable year, increased by any amount excluded from gross income under
§§ 911, 931, or 933." Id. (proposed I.R.C. § 25A(c)). This same limitation appears in the
current AOTC. See I.R.C. § 25A(d)(3). The current AOTC phases out between $80,000 to
$90,000 for single filers and between $160,000 and $180,000 for joint filers. Id. at § 25A(i)(4).
The modified AOTC would phase out between $43,000 and $64,000 for single filers and
between $86,000 and $126,000 for joint filers. H.R. 1 § 1201 (proposed I.R.C. § 25A(c)).
Under the House Ways and Means bill, Congress would index these levels for inflation,
beginning after 2018. Id. (proposed I.R.C. § 25A(g)).
135 The Lifetime Learning Credit remains unlimited in the number of years in which the
taxpayer may claim it. I.R.C § 25A(c). Thus, graduate and professional students may claim it.
It remains, however, a "per taxpayer" credit rather than a "per student" credit, which makes it
less advantageous for taxpayers with more than one child in graduate school. Id. at §
25A(c)(1). The AOTC, on the other hand, is a "per student" credit, meaning the taxpayer may
claim more than one such credit per return if the taxpayer has multiple children in college,
provided these children are in their first four years of college. Id. at § 25A(i).
136 See id. at § 117(b)(2) (defining "qualified tuition and related expenses").
137 Id.




their grant/scholarship amounts for living expenses, which would make them
taxable but would preserve qualified tuition and related expenses for the
AOTC, or they may spend the grants on qualified expenses and claim them
as such, 3 9 but forfeit the AOTC refund. 40
The House Ways and Means proposal provides that Congress will not
tax Pell Grants if used for room and board, and the student may apply the
grant to those expenses first without reducing qualified education expenses
for purposes of the new refundable AOTC.14 1 Thus, under the Ways and
Means bill, Congress would exclude Pell Grants from income regardless of
how the student used them, and Pell recipients would become eligible for the
refundable AOTC.
2. The House Budget Committee Discussion Draft
In 2014, the House Budget Committee released a discussion draft142 to
reform Pell Grants in anticipation of the reauthorization of the Higher
Education Act. 143 This draft proposes to fix the tax problems of the grants in
the same manner as the Ways and Means bill. While the Budget Committee
draft does not address the education tax incentives, it is noteworthy in its
139 Students may designate how they spend their Pell Grants, regardless of how the school
allocates the grant. Fact Sheet: Interaction of Pell Grants and Tax Credits: Students May Be
Foregoing Tax Benefits by Mistake, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY (June 10, 2014), https://www.
treasury.gov/connect/blog/Documents/Pell%20AOTC%204%20pager.pdf.
140 The optimal strategy is actually quite complex and may vary from student to student,
because it depends on the student's (or parents', if the student is a dependent) marginal tax
rate (which may change depending on how much of the grant is included in income), the
amount of tax liability, the amount of the expenses, etc. See supra note 134.
141 Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. § 1202 (2014). The student could pay
these expenses with a student loan and the student then would be able to claim the AOTC
refund.
142 H. BUDGET COMM., 113TH CONG., EXPANDING OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA, DISCUSSION
DRAFT44 (July 24, 2014).
143 Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). Congress has reauthorized the Higher Education
Act of 1965 nine times since its enactment, implementing a wealth of new programs and
spending changes. See LINDSEY BURKE, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, REAUTHORIZING THE
HIGHER EDUCATION ACT-TOWARD POLICIES THAT INCREASE ACCESS AND LOWER COSTS 1-2
(2014), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/20 14/08/reauthorizing-the-higher-education
-acttoward-policies-that-increase-access-and-lower-costs. The last reauthorization, however,
occurred in 2008. Id. at 1. Since then, Congress has not reached an agreement on the
reauthorization, so it has renewed and extended the provisions with little change. The next
reauthorization remains past due. For a discussion of the problems with the reauthorization,
see Michael Stratford, Higher Ed Overhaul Unlikely in 2016, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 2,
2016), https:// www. insidehighered. com/ news/ 2016/02/02/higher-education-act-overhaul-
long-shot-election-year.
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proposal to cut funding from the Pell Grant program. 144 In all, this draft calls
for spending cuts for higher education of $180 billion over ten years, 45 which
would severely jeopardize the viability of the Pell Grant program. It proposes
a ten-year freeze on the amount of the maximum Pell Grant and eliminates
mandatory budget funding of the grants 46 This would place the grants
entirely within the congressional appropriations process, making them
vulnerable to the vicissitudes of Congress and the austerity measures of
147
sequestration .
The purported rationale for these cuts is two-fold. First, the Pell Grant
program faces a funding deficit.148 Second, Pell Grants, along with other
forms of federal financial aid to students, contribute to the rising costs of
tuition. 14 9 It has been noted, however, that neither is accurate °. The Pell
program experienced unprecedented costs in the aftermath of the Great
Recession of 2008, when the job market was flat and many people who could
not find jobs chose to enroll or re-enroll in college.'5 1 Since that time,.
144 See DAVID REICH & BRANDON DEBOT, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, HOUSE
BUDGET COMMITTEE PLAN CUTS PELL GRANTS DEEPLY, REDUCING ACCESS TO HIGHER
EDUCATION (2015), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-24-15bud.pdf.
145 Id. at 6.
146 Id. at 1. Congress funds Pell Grants from both the mandatory budget and the
discretionary budget. Initially, Congress funded the grants entirely through the appropriations
process in the discretionary budget. In funding deficit years, the Department of Education would
borrow against the subsequent year's appropriation. If a surplus existed, Congress would use it
to pay grants in the upcoming year. In 2007, however, Congress made cost-saving changes to the
student loan program and redirected the money to the Pell Grant program. It established a
supplemental Pell Grant as an addition to the student's regular Pell Grant, funded through
mandatory funding with no spending cap, for ten years as an add-on through 2017. In 2010,
Congress ended subsidies to private lenders of student loans and instead began to offer loans
directly through the Department of Education. Congress again reinvested the savings from this
move in the Pell Grant program. The supplemental grant remains funded through mandatory
funding, but it became indexed for inflation through 2017 (and stops indexing in 2018). It is no
longer an add-on, but instead is an increase to the grant. The majority of the grant, however,
comes from the appropriations process. See PELL GRANT OVERVIEW, supra note 38.
147 If Congress fails to pass a budget, or if the deficit increases beyond a certain limit, it
triggers sequestration -a series of deep cuts to government programs. Congress authorized
this measure in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control (Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings) Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,99 Stat. 1037. Congress implemented sequestration
in 2013 to produce spending cuts of $1.2 trillion over ten years. See DAVID REICH, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, SEQUESTRATION AND ITS IMPACT ON NON-DEFENSE
APPROPRIATIONS (2015), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2-19-15bud.pdf.
148 2016 BUDGET PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 138 (describing funding cliff in 2018).
149 See discussion supra notes 48-72 and accompanying text.
150 See REICH & DEBOT, supra note 144, at 1-2.
151 See REPUBLICAN STAFF OF H. COMM. ON EDUC. AND THE WORKFORCE, 113TH CONG.,
STRENGTHENING AMERICA'S HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM 6 (2014) (The rapid growth of the
program was caused by a perfect storm of factors: the recent economic downturn that led to
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however, the economy has improved and costs for the Pell program have
152declined, to the point that the program currently produces a surplus. The
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the costs of the program
will continue to decline over the next decade.153
B. The Schumer Bill and the Senate Finance Committee Response
In 2013, Senator Charles Schumer introduced a bill "to extend and
modify the American Opportunity Tax Credit."' 15 4 This bill would repeal the
Lifetime Learning Credit and modify the AOTC, although like the current
AOTC, it would also remain a permanent credit, with forty percent
refundability.1 55 The bill, however, would increase the amount of the credit
from $2500 to $3000 for those students attending school at least half-time, 56
157
and it would raise the upper income limitations. The bill would eliminate
the current restriction on use of the credit to the first four years of
postsecondary education, but would cap the benefit at a lifetime amount of
$15,000. I5 ' The Schumer bill also would make Pell Grants tax-free regardless
of use, provided that the use conforms to the requirements of the grant.'
59
Like the House Ways and Means bill, the bill also would allow a student to
designate the amount of the Pell Grant to expenses other than qualified tuition
and related expenses, allowing the student, or the student's parents, to benefit
from both the tax exclusion of the Pell Grant and the AOTC refund. 6 °
Senator Schumer's bill was referred to the Senate Finance Committee
and analyzed by a Working Group of that committee, which criticized the
increased enrollment at institutions and greater demand for Pell Grants .... ").
152 See Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, It Looks as if the Government Can Afford to Revive
Year-Round Grants for Needy College Students, WASH. POST: GRADE POINT (Mar. 24, 2016),
https:// www. washingtonpost. com/ news/ grade-point/ wp /2016/03/24/ it- looks- as- if- the-
government-can-afford-to-revive-year-round-grants-for-needy-college-students/ (reporting
that the Pell program projects to have a $7.7 billion surplus this year); see also CONSORTIUM
FOR HIGHER EDUC. TAX REFORM, supra note 110, at 3 (Foreword) (pleading for any savings
from reform of education funding to be redirected to students and not "diverted to overall
deficit reduction").
153 The CBO projects a decline in costs of 0.5% per year, on average, in the program over
the next decade. See REICH & DEBOT, supra note 144.
154 American Opportunity Tax Credit Permanence and Consolidation Act of 2013, S. 835,
113th Cong. (2013).
155 Id. § 2 (proposed I.R.C. § 25A(g)).
156 Id. § 2(a) (proposed I.R.C. § 25A(b)(1)).
157 These limitations would increase from the current levels of $80,000 to $90,000 for
single filers, $160,000 to $180,000 for joint filers, to $80,000 to $100,000 for single filers,
$160,000 to $200,000 for joint filers. Id. § 2(a) (proposed I.R.C. § 25A(c)).
158 Id. § 2(a) (proposed I.R.C. § 25A(d)).
159 Id. § 3(a) (proposed I.R.C. § 117(b)).
160 Id. § 2(a) (proposed I.R.C. § 25A(d)(3)(B)).
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bill's proposed lifetime cap.1 61 The Working Group thought the added
complexity of tracking the use of the credit for purposes of the cap would
raise compliance costs for taxpayers and further overburden the Service by
increasing the potential for undetected fraud.'62
The cap may cause additional problems in determining the appropriate
allocation between taxpayers. For instance, if parents claim the credit and
have more than one child in college, and one of those children later tries to
claim a credit on his or her own, how, if at all, should the credit claimed by
the parents be allocated in determining the cap?
163
The Senate Finance Committee remained interested in reforming the
education tax incentives. In June 2014, it held hearings to examine the role
of the tax system in reducing student debt. 164 In July 2015, the Bipartisan Tax
Working Group discussed not only the Schumer bill, but it also discussed
reform of the education tax incentives in the broader context of reforming the
tax system.'
65
C. The Obama Proposal
In 2015, as part of his State of the Union address, President Obama
proposed free community college for students who enroll at least half-time,
maintain at least a 2.5 GPA, and have adjusted gross income of less than
$200,000.166 The President's proposal is the broadest of any of the other
current proposals in that it focuses not only on tax incentives and financial
aid to students, but also addresses incentives to institutions that graduate large
numbers of low-income students,167 and it provides oversight for institutions
161 See S. COMM. ON FIN., 113TH CONG., THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX, BIPARTISAN TAX




164 See 2014 S.Hrg., supra note 30.
165 See S. COMM. ON FIN., 113TH CONG., THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX, BIPARTISAN TAX
WORKING GROUP REPORT 29 (2015), http:// www. finance, senate. gov/ download/ the-
individual-tax-bipartisan-tax-working-group-report.
166 See President Barack Obama, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State
of the Union (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/
remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015; see also U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET, SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION 60-61 (2015), http://
www2. ed. gov/ about! overview/ budget/ budgetl6/ summary/ 16summary. pdf; Jordan
Weissmann, Obama's Free Community College Program Has a Catch, SLATE: MONEYBOX
(Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2015/02/02/obama free community-
college-program-wealthy-kids-need-notapply.html.
167 See The President's Budget: Fact Sheets on Key Issues, Empowering All Americans
with the Education and Skills They Need, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, https://www.whitehouse.
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and students that receive federal aid. 6 8
The President proposes a modified, permanent AOTC, similar to those
of the Ways and Means bill and the Schumer bill. Under the President's
proposal, however, the availability of the credit would expand to five years
of postsecondary education instead of the four years provided under current
law.' 69 In addition, the President proposes to coordinate the tax treatment of
Pell Grants with the AOTC in a manner similar to the Congressional
proposals.170 The White House further proposes to eliminate the deduction of
student loan interest because of administrative complexity and low
utilization.'7 ' Currently, the federal government taxes student loan
forgiveness after twenty to twenty-five years under the income based
repayment plan.' 72 Since this plan is available to those who have low-paying
gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2017/assets/fact-sheets/Empowering%20All%20Ameri
cans% 20with% 20the% 20Education% 20and% 20Skills% 20They% 20Need% 20.pdf (last
visited Oct. 31, 2016).
168 This proposal would limit Pell Grants for individuals who repeatedly enroll in
programs but do not earn academic credit. It also would strengthen academic progress
requirements and provide bonus grants to encourage students to graduate on time. Further, it
would provide bonus grants to colleges that successfully enroll and graduate low-income
students. Id.
169 See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: A
Simpler, Fairer Tax Code That Responsibly Invests in Middle Class Families (Jan. 17, 2015),
http://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/USEOPWHPO/2015/01/17/fileattachments/356
754/FactSheet.pdf; I.R.C. § 25A(i)(2).
170 In one important respect, Pell Grants receive different treatment under the
Congressional and Executive proposals. The Schumer bill would consider Pell Grants directed
to non-tuition and fees, to the extent paid by the student, as well as any amount of grant paid
in excess of qualified tuition and fees to be applied to reduce qualified tuition and fees paid
for purposes of the AOTC. The President's proposal would extend tax-exempt status to Pell
Grants, regardless of any excess amount over qualified expenses. As the Senate Finance
Committee Working Group noted, however, "at current Pell levels, this may be a difference
without a consequence, as generally an individual's living expenses in any given year are
estimated to exceed the maximum Pell Grant amount." S. COMM. ON FIN., 113TH CONG., THE
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX, BIPARTISAN TAX WORKING GROUP REPORT 29 n.48 (2015), http://
www.finance.senate.gov/download/the-individual-tax-bipartisan-tax-working-group-report.
171 See Michael Stratford, Obama's Final Two Years, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 21, 2015),
https:// www. insidehighered. com/ news/ 2015/ 01/ 21/ obamas- higher- education-plan-end-his-
term.
172 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (including income from discharge of indebtedness in the
definition of gross income). Under the William D. Ford Direct Loan Program (also called the
"Obama Student Loan Forgiveness Program"), loan payments may be contingent on the
borrower's income, family size, loan balance, and/or interest rate. Standard Plan, FED.
STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/understand/plans/standard (last visited
Oct. 31,2016). The federal government would forgive any outstanding balance on these loans
at the end of a twenty-five year period. For new loans, Congress already reduced the period
before forgiveness to twenty years. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 2213, 124 Stat. 1029, 1081. For those working in public service, a ten-
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jobs and/or large families relative to their earned income, the President
proposes to make this forgiveness tax-free.
73
The President had proposed to tax earnings on new contributions to QTPs
on the basis that the current exemption inures primarily to the benefit of higher-
income families . He subsequently withdrew this proposal, however,
because of strong bipartisan opposition.' 
75
The President also proposes to permanently expand Pell Grants in two
new programs. The first is the "Second Chance Pell Program," which would
apply to prisoners eligible for release, to facilitate their future assimilation
176into society and assist them in obtaining employment. The second program
is the "On Track Pell Program" in which grants would be awarded to students
who stay on course to graduate on time. 77
The centerpiece of the Obama proposal, however, is the "America's
College Promise" program, which authorizes the Department of Education to
award grants to cover tuition at community colleges. 178 The President argues
year payment period before loan forgiveness applies. See Public Service Loan Forgiveness
Program, FED. STUDENT AID (Dec. 2015), https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/
public-service-loan-forgiveness.pdf.
173 Currently, there are three income contingent repayment plans available for Direct
Loans, but under the President's proposal, the PAYE plan (Pay-As-You-Earn) would be the
only one available for new loans originating after July 1,2016. The payments would be capped
at 10% of the borrower's discretionary income and would allow forgiveness after twenty years.
The proposal would cap the amount of public service forgiveness at $57,500. See Allesandra
Lanza, What Obama's 2016 Budget Proposal Means for Student Borrowers, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Feb. 11, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-
loan-ranger/2015/02/1 1/what-obamas-2016-budget-proposal-means-for-student-borrowers.
174 The Administration notes that approximately 80% of the tax benefits of QTPs inure
to the benefit of families earning more than $250,000. Stratford, supra note 171.
175 See John D. McKinnon, Obama Drops Plan to Raise Taxes on '529' College Savings
Accounts, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2015, 12:23 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-drops-
plan-to-raise-taxes-on-529-accounts- 1422390991.
176 In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act,
which overturned § 401(b)(8) of the Higher Education Act, making those incarcerated
ineligible to receive Pell Grants. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 20411, 108 Stat. 1796, 1828 (1994). The Second Chance Pell program
is currently a pilot program of the Department of Education. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Educ., U.S. Department of Education Launches Second Chance Pell Pilot Program for
Incarcerated Individuals (July 31, 2015), http:// www. ed. gov/ news/ press- releases/ us-
department-education-launches-second-chance-pell-pilot-program-incarcerated-individuas.
177 Those students taking at least fifteen credit hours per semester and who are set to
graduate on time will receive an extra $300 "on-track Pell bonus" added to their grant. College
Affordability and Completion: Assuring a Pathway to Opportunity, U.S. DEP'T EDUC., http://
www.ed.gov/college (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
178 The House introduced the America's College Promise Act, H.R. 2962, 114th Cong.
(2015), to implement this program, but no identified funding source exists, so presently
enactment remains unlikely. The bill was referred to the House Subcommittee on Higher
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that the proposal represents a fundamental cultural shift in higher education
policy.179 This program would provide free community college tuition funded
by the federal government, in partnership with the states. 10 The federal
government would make the program available to students who meet certain
requirements.' 8' Congress estimates the program to cost almost $80 billion
over ten years, 182 which the President proposes to pay by raising taxes on
wealthy Americans and financial institutions.'83
Over forty percent of students attending community colleges are
minorities and over half of community college students attend part-time
Education and Workforce Training on November 16, 2015, and related bills were introduced
in the Senate. See America's College Promise Act, S. 1716, 114th Cong. (2015) (referred to
the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions); In the Red Act, S. 2677, 114th Cong.
(2016) (referred to the S. Comm. on Fin.).
Reformers modeled the America's College Promise program after both the Tennessee
Promise Program, implemented by Republican Governor Bill Haslam, and the Chicago free
community college program, implemented by Mayor Rahm Emanuel. Minnesota and Oregon
also have similar programs and another eleven states have legislation under consideration.
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AMERICA'S COLLEGE PROMISE: A PROGRESS REPORT ON FREE
COMMUNITY COLLEGE 4 (2015) [hereinafter EXEC. OFFICE REPORT], https://whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/docs/progressreportoncommunitycollege.pdf. Additionally, some local
programs - similar to the program in Chicago - seek to support free community college
programs. See Dustin Weeden, Free Community College, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
(Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.ncsl .org/research/education/free-community-college.aspx.
179 Michael Stratford, Middle-Class Economics for Tuition, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 21,
2015), http:// www. insidehighered. com! news/ 2015/01/ 21/ obama-pitches-free-community-
college-higher-education-tax-credits-state-union.
180 The states would cover 25% of the cost and the federal government would cover the
remainder. The federal government will require community colleges to pass federal eligibility
requirements. In addition, some of the legislation pending in other states would impose other
restrictions, such as requiring students to maintain a certain GPA and to remain in the state for a
certain period of time after graduation. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 341.522(3)(e) (2016)
(requiring a cumulative grade point average of 2.5 or better in high school to receive a waiver of
tuition for community colleges). Most of the pending legislation would cover only tuition and
fees. Washington state's legislation, however, the Washington Promise Program, offers a stipend
of up to $1500 for books and other related expenses for needy students. Compare S. 6481, 64th
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(7)(b) (Wash. 2016), with H.R. 2820, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(7)(b) (Wash.
2016). See also Washington Promise Comparison, LEAGUE EDUC. VOTERS (Jan. 2016), http://
educationvoters.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01 /Washington-Promise-Comparison.pdf.
181 See supra text accompanying note 166.
182 Cong. Research Serv., Bill Summary & Status H.R. 2962, 114th Cong. (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 114th-congress/house-bill/2962. Congress will allocate
approximately $10 billion of this amount to grants for historically black colleges, universities,
and other minority-serving institutions that enroll at least 35% low-income students, helping
to improve completion rates and student outcomes.
183 Stratford, supra note 171. The President asked for $60 billion to cover the initial basic
cost of the program. Id.
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while working to support their families.' 84 Free tuition for the first two years
of postsecondary education will not only give the underprivileged a start
toward obtaining a college degree, but it will also likely reduce student
borrowing and defaults in the long run. This is because postsecondary
enrollment eventually will reach an optimal point, since not everyone has an
interest in or aptitude for higher education. Those who realize this after
enrolling, incurring student loans and dropping out, have unusually high rates
of student loan defaults.185 Providing the first two years of college free, with
conditions to keep grades at a certain level, would help cull those who might
otherwise drop out. Thus, a program of free community college may pay for
itself simply by reducing the rate of student loan defaults."'
D. The Education Consortium Proposal
The Consortium Report recommends reforming the tax incentives and
redirecting the savings to the Pell Grant program.1 87 Similar to the other
proposals, the Report recommends coordinating AOTC benefits with Pell
Grants and eliminating the tax on Pell Grants.188 The Report focuses heavily
on reforming the AOTC. Like the other proposals, it would eliminate the
Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits,' 89 although unlike the other proposals,
the Report recommends making the AOTC fully refundable.190 The proposal
would replace the four-year limit on the use of the AOTC with a $10,000
lifetime cap;1 9 1 the four-year limitation creates confusion, whereas a lifetime
184 See EXEC. OFFICE REPORT, supra note 178, at 11-12.
185 See James, supra note 72 (noting that students who drop out default on their loans at a
much higher rate than those who graduate, even if the balance is much lower comparatively). See
also 2012 S.Hrg., supra note 14, at 44 (testimony of Dr. Susan Dynarski, Professor, University
of Michigan, Faculty Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, and Research
Associate, Center for Analysis of Postsecondary Education and Employment) (finding that
students at for-profit colleges drop out, borrow, and default on loans at an unusually high rate).
186 It also would pay for itself by producing a more educated workforce and a more robust
economy with a larger number of taxpayers. See discussion of positive externalities, supra
notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
187 See CONSORTIUM REPORT, supra note 110, at 25. The Report consists of four parts.
The main part is a "set of consensus policy recommendations" of the Consortium, entitled
Higher Education Tax Reform: A Shared Agenda for Increasing College Affordability,
Access, and Success. There are also four issue briefs exploring in greater depth specific aspects
of the consensus report. These reports focus on strengthening outreach of the AOTC, the
timing mismatch between the payment of tuition and the receipt of the tax benefit, standards
to encourage institutional improvement, and tax-exempt borrowing by postsecondary
institutions. Id.
... Id. at 17, 22.
89 Id. at 20.
90 Id. at 17.
191 Id. at 21.
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cap would treat taxpayers fairly and more uniformly.1 92  This
recommendation is similar to that of the Schumer bill and susceptible to the
same criticisms.1 93 In addition, the proposal would double the phase-out
ranges by raising the upper limits of the income limitations. 94 The limitations
would adjust for inflation beginning in 2018.'9'
The current AOTC adopts the provision of the former Hope Credit that
196bans its use by individuals convicted of a felony drug offense 9. The
Consortium's recommendation would eliminate this lifetime ban on the
grounds of fairness and increasing access for the economically
disadvantaged. 97 The Consortium also recommends the creation of some
mechanism, such as advance payment of the credit, to address the timing
problem of the mismatch between the AOTC refund and the due date of
tuition payments.
98
The Consortium places great emphasis on outreach and awareness of the
AOTC, suggesting that all stakeholders engage in publicizing the credit and
encouraging participation, particularly by low- and lower-middle income
192 Id. The four-year limitation created problems because some taxpayers thought the credit
was available for only one of the past four years. Commentators attribute this to a confusing
sentence on the IRS Form 8863. See Troy Onink, IRS Confirms, American Opportunity Tax
Credit Good for 4 Years, FORBES (Feb. 26, 2013, 10:09 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
troyonink/2013/02/26/irs-confirms-american-opportunity-tax-credit-good-for-4-years/#1e044f6
920e8. Also, the credit is available for four taxable years (generally a calendar year) but is
attributable to four full years of postsecondary education. This creates particular confusion for
students who alternate between full-time and part-time status. See CONsORTIUM REPORT, supra
note 110, at 21.
193 See supra notes 158, 161-163 and accompanying text.
194 So, for single filers the proposal would reduce the credit for modified AGI between
$40,000 and $60,000, instead of between $40,000 and $50,000, as it currently stands. For joint
filers, the phase-out range would begin with modified AGI of $80,000 and would completely
phase out when the modified AGI reaches $120,000, instead of phasing out between $80,000
and $100,000, as it does currently. CONSORTIUM REPORT, supra note 110, at 14 tbl.2.
9 Id. at 21.
196 I.R.C. § 25A(b)(2)(D). This provision applies to any student who "has been convicted
of a Federal or State felony offense consisting of the possession or distribution of a controlled
substance before the end of the taxable year with or within which such period ends." Id. The
provision does not apply to the Lifetime Learning Credit. See id. at § 25A(c).
197 The Consortium reasons that not only do the drug laws vary widely from state to state,
but studies have shown that the ban does not deter the commission of drug offenses. On the
other hand, it does deter those convicted of such offenses from pursuing higher education.
This disproportionately impacts the economically disadvantaged and those who are first
generation college attendees. See CONSORTIUM REPORT, supra note 110, at 22. This makes it
much more likely that these individuals will continue on a path to criminality.
198 Id. at 22. The Report was vague as to how this would be accomplished, but the
Consortium promised to study the problem to try to discern a feasible solution. Id. at 23.
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taxpayers.199
In addition, the Consortium recommends eliminating the tuition and fees
deduction and Coverdell accounts because both are regressive benefits used
200primarily by higher-income taxpayers. It also recommends phasing out,
under the same income limitations as the AOTC, the student loan interest
deduction20 ' and the parental exemption for dependent students, which it
refers to as "the worst-targeted of all the higher education tax benefits .,,202 It
further recommends limiting the exclusion of employer-provided educational
assistance to undergraduate certificates and degrees 20 3 and imposing income
204limits and other reforms on QTPs.
IV. ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
A more educated populace not only would strengthen the national
economy, but it also would make the United States more competitive in the
global economy. Thus, the federal government's goal for education should
be twofold: (1) to expand educational opportunities for the economically
disadvantaged, minorities, and those who are the first in their families to
attend college, as well as for those who otherwise would not have enrolled in
college, and (2) to encourage the retention of this group to make it more likely
that they will complete their degrees. The federal government should fund
this goal with equity, efficiency, and simplicity in mind.
A. Direct Benefits
For many lower- and middle-income individuals, the spiraling costs of
higher education may seem insurmountable. The considerable benefits of a
college education may be outweighed by missed opportunity costs and the
prospect of staggering debt. For these individuals, tax incentives will not be
a decisive factor in whether or not to pursue higher education. Thus, targeted
benefits such as grants, scholarships, and fellowships that do not have to be
repaid, or low-interest, subsidized loans with flexible payment plans are
199 Id. at 23. These stakeholders include the secondary and postsecondary educational
institutions, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Department of Education,
community organizations, and volunteer and commercial tax preparation entities. Id.
200 Id. at 20-21. In addition, the Report notes that Coverdell accounts "are becoming a
subsidy for private elementary and secondary schools, rather than a way to pay for college." Id.
at 21.
201 id. at 18.
202 Id. at 17-18.
203 Id. at 18-19.
204 Id. at 18. Other suggestions for reforming QTPs include imposing limits on
contributions and "changing the treatment of these assets in the Expected Family Contribution
calculation" for the determination of federal financial assistance. Id.
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much more likely to be persuasive. This phenomenon aptly illustrates the fact
that tax benefits and subsidies are not substitutes for one another. Thus, any
meaningful reform of federal funding for higher education must be done in a
holistic manner in which direct benefits are the cornerstone and tax incentives
fill in the gaps.
In fiscal year 2015, the federal government spent approximately $130
205billion on direct benefits such as grants, loans, and work-study programs.
206The second largest of these was the Pell Grant program. The average Pell
Grant today, however, covers only approximately one-third of the total cost
of a public four-year, in-state college.2 °7 This is down from around half in the
1980s and around seventy percent in the 1970s.2 °8
In examining enrollment trends since the 1960s, the cost of tuition and
205 See supra note 6; see also supra note 35.
206 In fiscal year 2015, the government spent approximately $30.3 billion on Pell Grants
awarded to nearly 8.2 million students, $95.6 billion on student loans, $1 billion on the federal
work-study program, and $15.2 billion on veterans' educational assistance. See COLL. BD.,
supra note 8, at 10 tbl.l.
207 THE INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS, PELL GRANTS HELP KEEP COLLEGE
AFFORDABLE FOR MILLIONS OF AMERICANS 1 (2016), http://ticas.org/sites/default/files/pub-
files/overall-pell-one-pager.pdf. The maximum Pell Grant for 2015-2016 was $5775. Federal
Pell Grant Program, U.S. DEP'T EDUC. (June 4, 2015), http://www2.ed.gov/programs/fpg/
index.html. For academic year 2016-2017, it will increase to $5815. See Federal Pell Grants,
FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/grants-scholarships/pell#how-much-
money (last visited Nov., 2, 2016). The federal government determine this amount by (1) the
amount the federal government expects the student's family to contribute (EFC) (including
the amount of the student's income, the value of his or her assets (if the student is independent),
and the number of family members, with emphasis on those members attending postsecondary
institutions), (2) the cost of attendance at the institution in which the student plans to enroll,
(3) the student's enrollment status (full-time or part-time), and (4) whether the student attends
for a full academic year or less. See id. Since they are grants rather than loans, the recipient
does not have to be repay them. Congress established the first version of the program under
Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, 1232
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1070), under the Johnson administration as Basic
Educational Opportunity Grants, and renamed for U.S. Senator Claiborne Pell in 1988 to
commemorate his work on education. Pell Grants, PELL INST. (2016),
http://www.pellinstitute.org/pell-grants.shtml.
208 See Larry Abramson, All Things Considered: Why Is College So Expensive?, NPR
(Oct. 19, 2011, 2:34 PM) (quoting Lauren Asher, President, The Institute for College Access
and Success in California), http://www.npr.org/201l1/10/19/141505658/why-is-college-so-
expensive. The maximum Pell Grant covered 61% of average tuition and fees at public four-
year institutions in 2015-2016. This represented a decrease of thirteen percentage points from
2005-2006. Betsy Prueter, Trends in Student Aid and Trends in College Pricing 2015,
POSTSECONDARY NAT'L POL'Y INST. (Nov. 16, 2015), https://pnpi.org/2015/11/16/trends-in-
student- aid- and- trends- in- college- pricing- 2015/. Considering that a public, four-year
institution with room and board currently costs $19,548, the average Pell Grant today covers
less than one-third of that cost. Id.
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fees remains a paramount factor influencing the decision by lower- and middle-
income individuals to enroll in college, particularly the concomitant issues of
the debt they face at the end and their ability to repay that debt.2" The
availability of adequate federal aid and the certainty of benefits, including low-
interest loans, should positively affect enrollment by these individuals.
Since the financial crisis of 2008, however, student debt has more than
doubled,21 ° leading to speculation that it represents the next housing
bubble .21 1 Today, forty million Americans remain saddled with student loans
and twenty-five percent of borrowers are either delinquent or in default on
212those loans. A number of reasons explain this crisis. First, states cut
support for higher education, causing a vicious cycle that forces colleges to
213raise tuition. Federal assistance has not kept pace with the rising cost of
209 Questions remain as to whether the education tax incentives encourage students to
assume more debt than they feasibly might repay. See 2014 S.Hrg., supra note 30, at 4
(statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Member of S. Comm. on Fin.). Other factors, however,
such as the economy, influence college enrollment. In a robust economy, more disposable
income and the ability to get a better paying job may persuade some to continue their
education. In an economic downturn, the inability to find jobs combined with the availability
of financial assistance has contributed to college enrollment. Clifton B. Parker, The Great
Recession Spurred Student Interest in Higher Education, Stanford Expert Says, STANFORD
NEWS (Mar. 6, 2015), http://news.stanford.edu/20 15/03/06/higher-ed-hoxby-030615/.
210 The financial crisis caused not only the value of homes to plummet, but also the value
of retirement accounts to nosedive. This, combined with the scarcity of jobs and the flat
salaries of middle-class taxpayers, has led more and more students to consider higher
education and to borrow to pay for that education, resulting in a record $1.3 trillion in student
debt by the end of 2015. See Financing Higher Education: Exploring Current Challenges and
Potential Alternatives: Hearing Before the J. Econ. Comm., 114th Cong. 60 (2015)
[hereinafter J. Econ. Comm. Hrg.] (testimony of Rohit Chopra, Senior Fellow, Center for
American Progress, formerly assistant director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau)
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114shrg97328/pdf/CHRG-114shrg97328.pdf. This
amount does not include other forms of debt that families may have incurred to pay the costs
of education, such as tapping credit cards, retirement plans, home equity, and draining their
savings. Id.
211 See 2014 S.Hrg., supra note 30, at 4 (opening statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch,
Member, S. Comm. on Fin.).
212 See Jillian Berman, America's Growing Student-Loan-Debt Crisis, MARKETWATCH
(Jan. 19, 2016, 2:11 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/americas-growing-student-
loan-debt-crisis-2016-01-15. However, the cohort default rate for Stafford Loans declined in
late 2015, attributable to the income-based repayment plans in which the Department of
Education reported a 50% increase in the number of borrowers taking advantage of these
options. See Betsy Mayotte, Falling Student Loan Default Rates Still Challenge Borrowers,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 7, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/
blogs/ student- loan- ranger/ 2015/10/07/falling- student- loan- default- rates- still-challenge-
borrowers (stating that the default rate increased from 13.7% in 2014 to 11.8% in 2015).
213 See Michael Mitchell et al., Funding Down, Tuition Up: State Cuts to Higher
Education Threaten Quality and Affordability at Public Colleges, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y
PRIORITIES (Aug. 15, 2016), http:// www. cbpp. org/ research/ state- budget- and- tax/ funding-
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this tuition, forcing students to borrow more money for their education.
2 4
Second, government policies do not serve these borrowers well. Paying for
these loans through income-based repayment plans provides some relief, but
many borrowers fail to realize that they must timely renew these loans each
year. If not, dire consequences can make repayment of the loans even more
difficult.21 5 Consolidation of loans also can provide some relief, but the fact
that this is complicated by the fact that the borrower must be cognizant of the
type of loan involved. In some cases, the interest rate may increase; in others,
special benefits, such as loan forgiveness, to which the borrower may have
216been entitled, may be terminated.
The federal government profits from student loans because it charges far
higher interest rates than it must pay to borrow the funds to lend to students.
This is particularly true with PLUS loans to parents and graduate students,
which carry higher interest rates than other types of student loans and offer
217
minimal opportunities for debt relief. These loans have been called "classic
predatory lending ,"28 but there is little optimism that the federal government




215 Disturbingly, sixty percent of these borrowers failed to timely renew their repayment
plans and nearly a third of these ended up in forbearance or deferment. Mayotte, supra note
212. Since many borrowers pay through automatic deduction from their bank accounts, they
may fail to open a notice from their lender, thinking that it is a bill they can disregard. See
Betsy Mayotte, Follow 4 Tips to Stay on Top of an Income-Driven Repayment Plan, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 23, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/
blogs/student-loan-ranger/2015/09/23/follow-4-tips-to-stay-on-top-of-an-income-driven-
repayment-plan. This can result in drastic consequences for these borrowers, such as
increasing monthly payments, increasing loan principal because of additional accrued interest,
and terminating interest subsidies. Id.
216 This is especially the case with Perkins Loans, which provide for forgiveness after a
certain period for those working in certain areas, such as full-time firefighters, nurses, law
enforcement or corrections officers, VISTA or Peace Corps volunteers, and attorneys working
as federal or community public defenders. See Forgiveness, Cancellation and Discharge
Charts, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/
charts (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
217 Reyna Gobel, Consider 4 Factors About Graduate PLUS Loans Before Borrowing,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 15, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/
best- graduate- schools/ paying/ articles/ 2013/ 03/ 15/ consider- 4- factors- about- graduate-
plus-loans-before-borrowing.
218 Michael Grunwald, The U.S. Government's Predatory-Lending Program, POLITICO:
AGENDA (June 19,2015,5:17 AM) (quoting Rachel Fishman, Education Policy Analyst, New
America), http:// www. politico. com/ agenda/ story/ 2015/ 06/ the-us-governments-predatory-
lending-program-000094.
219 Id. (quoting same). In 2002, the government set interest rates for both subsidized and
unsubsidized Stafford Loans at 6.8% for loans originating after July 1,2006. Rachel Rowan,
Is Congress to Blame for Student Loan Crisis?, TuITION.10 (June 17, 2014), https://www.
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In addition, the federal government's track record in overseeing the
management of student loans has been poor, subjecting Sallie Mae and other
government contractors to multiple large penalties for unfair lending
practices .220
Although an in-depth examination of the federal government's actions
in relation to student loans is beyond the scope of this article, 22 clearly the
federal government must exert greater oversight and control on behalf of
student borrowers. Congress should consider this issue in a holistic review
of the problems of funding higher education. The federal government must
enforce the student consumer protection laws, help borrowers manage their
222payments, and provide better opportunities to refinance student debt.
B. Indirect Benefits
The myriad problems that the current education tax incentives present
demonstrate that they are neither equitable, efficient, nor fair. Thus, many of
them should be repealed, as the current proposals suggest. This article makes
alternative suggestions to reform the tax incentives, which share some
tuition.io/blog/2013/04/is-congress-to-blame-for-student-loan-crisistwin/. Because of the
events of September 11,2001, however, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates several times in
an effort to boost the economy. Id. This made the 6.8% fixed rate much higher than the variable
rate. Id. It also meant that the federal government made a large profit from student loans
because it could borrow the money for these loans at the much lower rate. Id. Congress, so far,
has failed to provide relief for this cohort of borrowers.
220 These contractors, Sallie Mae, Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, Wachovia, Bank of
America, Nelnet, Wells Fargo, and College Loan Corporation, all agreed to stiff penalties in
2007 to avoid charges of wrongdoing in connection with these practices. See J. Econ. Comm.
Hrg., supra note 210, at 61 (testimony of Rohit Chopra, Senior Fellow, Center for American
Progress, formerly assistant director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau). Some also
accuse the federal government itself of engaging in predatory lending practices on education
loans. See Grunwald, supra note 218. In 2014, federal regulators ordered Sallie Mae to pay a
fine of $96.6 million to military student loan borrowers for unfair lending practices involving
the student loans of more than 60,000 active duty service members. See Chris Hicks, Federal
Regulators Fine Sallie Mae for Overcharging and Discriminating Against Borrowers, JOBS
WITH JUST. (May 13, 2014), http://www.jwj.org/victory-federal-regulators-fine-sallie-mae-
for-overcharging-and-discriminating-against-borrowers.
221 The author will examine this in more depth in Follow the Money: The Evolution and
Inefficiency of Federal Funding for Higher Education (in progress). See supra note 22.
222 See J. Econ. Comm. Hrg., supra note 210, at 66 (testimony of Rohit Chopra, Senior
Fellow, Center for American Progress, formerly assistant director of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau). The federal government should also provide greater oversight for
educational institutions. Those that do not provide quality education and have an inordinate
number of dropouts and/or defaulters should not be eligible for federal funding. See Rooney
Columbus, A Crisis of Value, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 17, 2015, 11:45 AM), http://




common features with the current proposals. There are some important
differences, however, that could have a larger impact on college enrollment
and retention.
1. Savings Incentives
There are three current tax incentives designed to encourage savings for
223 224higher education: education savings bonds, qualified tuition plans, and
225Coverdell educational savings accounts. Less than three percent of
families, however, use qualified tuition plans and Coverdell accounts, and
226these families tend to fall in the higher-income ranges. Thus, these
incentives neither influence the decisions nor behavior of the lower-income
target group, nor do they affect overall college enrollment and retention
because individuals in the higher-income ranges generally enroll in college
227
without the incentives.
All of the current proposals would repeal Coverdell accounts. As the
Education Consortium stated in its report, not only do a relatively small
number of taxpayers use Coverdell accounts, but they also tend to use them
228to offset the cost of private secondary education . Since taxpayers subsidize
these accounts, as with all tax incentives, this is an inefficient result.
Although President Obama proposed to eliminate QTPs by taxing
interest accumulation on new contributions, he succumbed to political
pressure and withdrew this proposal. 229 The Ways and Means bill would
repeal all of the savings devices except QTPs. 23 For lower-income families,
however, QTPs and Coverdell accounts usually will remain out of reach,
because these families generally will not have much disposable income to
231
contribute to these accounts 1. QTPs are more complicated than either
Coverdell accounts or educational savings bonds. For one thing, investment
in a QTP generally requires some financial sophistication because banks
221 I.R.C. § 135.
224 Id. § 529.
225 Id. § 530.
226 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-64, HIGHER EDUCATION: A SMALL
PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES SAVE IN 529 PLANS 14-15 (2012); see also GREER & LEVIN, supra
note 9, at 4-5. According to the GAO, 47% of families that use QTPs have incomes above
$150,000, whereas the median income of families with a student in college is $47,747. U.S.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-] 3-64, HIGHER EDUCATION: A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF
FAMILIES SAVE IN 529 PLANS 16, 20 tbl.1 (2012).
227 See Schenk & Grossman, supra note 9, at 324-25.
228 See supra CONSORTIUM REPORT, supra note 110, at 21.
229 See Stratford, supra note 171; McKinnon, supra note 175.
230 See Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. (2014).
231 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-64, HIGHER EDUCATION: A SMALL
PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES SAVE IN 529 PLANS 14-15 (2012).
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232
usually charge fees that may vary with the individual plans . If an individual
can make only small contributions, these fees will have a noticeable effect.
Another issue is that QTPs remain subject to market risk, unlike Coverdell
233accounts and savings bonds. If the value of a QTP declines, this
disproportionately affects a lower-income contributor. On the other hand, if
the value of the plan increases, it is considered an asset of the contributor,
which may affect the family's qualification for certain types of public
assistance. 234 Moreover, if the family remains in the lower-income tax
brackets, it may become eligible for federal or institutional educational
assistance, so a tax-favored educational savings device is not a feasible
232 Id. at 22-24. The Coverdell account also may charge fees if the contributor invests in
a mutual fund, although no-load funds remain available.
233 States differ in their approach to investing these funds. For example, during the
economic crisis of 2008, QTPs in North Carolina, Maryland, and Virginia lost up to 30% of
their value. See Saving For College: 529 Plans, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 22,
2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/saving-for-college-529-plans.aspx. In Florida,
though, QTP assets were invested more conservatively and the value of these assets did not
decline during 2008. Id. Even prepaid tuition plans, which remain less susceptible to market
risks, depend upon the state operating the plan to maintain its solvency. Id. Some states
experienced shortfalls that necessitated their taking action to ensure the solvency of their plans.
Id.
234 The federal government addressed this issue with respect to the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF),
so that savings in a QTP would not disqualify the family for SNAP or TANF benefits. See
Rourke O'Brien, 529s and Public Assistance, NEW AM. (Nov. 10, 2009),
https://www.newamerica.org/asset-building/policy-papers/529s-and-public-assistance/. The
states, however, impose their own asset limits on SNAP, TANF, and Medicaid benefits, where
some are more generous than others. Thirty-four states, plus the District of Columbia,
eliminated the asset test for SNAP benefits, while eight states eliminated the asset test for
TANF benefits. Corp. for Econ. Dev., Asset Limits in Public Benefit Programs, ASSET &
OPPORTUNITY SCORECARD (2016), http://scorecard.assetsandopportunity.org/latest/measure/
asset-limits-in-public-benefit-programs. Furthermore, among those states with limits, the
amount of the limit may vary. Both the federal government and the states should address the
asset limits issue across the board, so that they do not remain a disincentive to saving for
education or retirement. Currently, in states that apply an assets test for federal benefit
eligibility, a QTP remains a "countable asset." Thus, in order to remain eligible for benefits in
those states, the contributor must spend the assets in the QTP, which triggers not only a tax
liability, but also the 10% penalty on any disqualified distribution. If the contributor transfers
the QTP to another family member, this may be a considered a transfer of assets that could
trigger a penalty under the Medicaid rules. Note that the federal government has not addressed
any of these issues with respect to savings bonds.
The QTP assets are considered owned by the contributor and will count toward the
expected family contribution (EFC) for the determination of federal educational assistance. In
calculating the EFC, however, the federal government considers parents' assets at a level of
5.64% as opposed to student-owned assets, which the federal government considers at a level




alternative for those in the lower-income tax brackets.
Those in the higher income tax brackets, however, can better afford to
save for higher education and likely do not need a tax benefit to encourage
them to do so.235 Thus, QTPs and Coverdell accounts remain very inefficient
savings vehicles if the goal is to encourage those who otherwise would not
have continued their education. Because of this inefficiency, Congress should
repeal these incentives, with the benefits of current plans grandfathered into
the program.
236
The Ways and Means bill repeals the tax benefits of educational savings
bonds, and the other proposals do not address them at all, probably because
taxpayers seldom use them compared to the other incentives.237 Several
advantages of educational savings bonds, however, make them a much more
efficient and equitable savings device for higher education. First, they remain
a more secure investment because they are backed by the full faith and credit
of the federal government. Moreover, they represent an investment in the
federal government, whereas QTPs are state-controlled devices. Since the
federal government provides significant funding for higher education, why
not invest in the federal government in return? Second, these bonds are less
complicated than either QTPs or Coverdell accounts. They do not require
establishing a separate account, they charge no fees (unlike QTPs and
Coverdell accounts), they do not fluctuate in value (like QTPs), and they are
238
easy to purchase . Third, they may be purchased in small increments of $25,
up to a maximum single purchase of $10,000.239 Because of this feature,
235 See Schenk & Grossman, supra note 9, at 324-25.
236 When President Obama proposed repealing the favorable tax benefits of QTPs, severe
blowback from both political parties resulted. Thus, this proposal will not be politically
feasible because this incentive remains popular with higher-income constituents. See Stratford,
supra note 171; McKinnon, supra note 175; see also discussion supra notes 174-175 and
accompanying text.
237 The OMB projects their cost at around $30 million in fiscal year 2016. See 2017
BUDGET PERSPECTIVES, supra note 25, at 230 tbl.14-1. This is approximately the same as the
cost of Coverdell accounts. Id. These two incentives have the lowest revenue cost of any of
the education tax incentives.
238 They may be purchased online or automatically through a payroll savings plan. See
BUREAU OF FISCAL SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, U.S. SAVINGS BONDS FOR
EDUCATION, FS PUBLICATION 0051 (2015), https://www.treasurydirect.gov/forms/savpdp
0051 .pdf (addressing questions about the savings bonds in general, including how to purchase
and who may purchase).
239 Education savings bonds consist of two types: series EE and series I. Each type has a
$10,000 limit on a single purchase, so one could purchase $20,000 of bonds ($10,000 for each
series) in two separate transactions. See Series EE Savings Bonds, TREASURYDIRECT (May 2,
2016), https:// www. treasury direct. gov/ indiv/ products/ prod-eebondsglance.htm; Series I
Savings Bonds, TREASURYDIRECT (May 2, 2016), https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/
products/prodjibonds-glance.htm.
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individuals of all income levels may purchase the bonds.
So why do taxpayers seldom use them? The answer is that they have
some severe statutory drawbacks. First, like most of the tax incentives, the
interest is excludable only if the taxpayer uses the bonds for a qualified
educational expense, which in the case of educational savings bonds only
includes tuition and related fees.24 0 This provision remains the most
restrictive definition of any of the educational savings tax incentives. It also
presents the same catch-22 as Pell Grants: if the bonds are not used for a
qualified education expense, they become taxable,24 ' but payment of
qualified tuition and fees with the bonds reduces the ability to use any other
available tax incentive, such as the AOTC, that might produce a greater
benefit to the taxpayer.
242
A second (and bigger) problem is the restrictive income limitations, the
243most restrictive of any of the three tax incentive savings devices. The
problem is that these limitations apply to the mAGI of the bondholder in the
year of the redemption of the bond.244 This makes long-term planning very
difficult. Young parents thinking ahead and purchasing bonds for their
children's education usually have no idea what their mAGI might be in ten
to fifteen years or more when their children become ready for college. Nor
do they have any idea what the statutory phase-out limitation might be at that
245point. These circumstances create a dilemma for young parents. If their
mAGI is greater than the income limitation when their children begin college,
the deferred interest on the bond becomes taxable, which makes the bonds a
very poor investment. On the other hand, if their mAGI is below the income
limitation, their children may qualify for federal assistance and they may not
need the bonds. Thus, the bonds involve very speculative decisions at the
time of purchase. Parents cannot avoid the income limitations by transferring
the bonds to the child because someone over age 24 must purchase and hold
them.246
240 I.R.C. § 135(a), (c)(2)(A).
241 See id. § 135(a).
242 See, e.g., id. § 25A(g)(2)(c), (g)(5); see also supra note 76 and accompanying text.
243 This limitation applies to single filers with mAGIs in excess of $40,000 and to joint
filers with mAGIs in excess of $60,000. Id. § 135(b)(2)(A). QTPs have no phase-out
limitations and Coverdell accounts phase out when the contributor's mAGI exceeds $95,000
for single taxpayers and $190,000 for joint filers. Id. §§ 529,530(c).
244 Id. § 135(a). Congress obviously intended this provision for grandparents and other
older family members living on fixed incomes.
245 Many young parents may not purchase the bonds because they might remain
optimistic and assume that their incomes will be above the phase-out limit when they redeem
the bonds.
246 Id. § 135(c)(1). This provision exists to alleviate the problem of a child purchasing
the bonds to avoid the phase-out limitations.
2017]
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Any tax-deferred savings device with associated fees will not serve as a
useful device for lower- and lower-middle income families. This makes the
savings bonds a superior savings device in terms of aiding the target group.
Also, the simplicity and ease of purchase, combined with the fact that
taxpayers may purchase the bonds in small increments, make them more
likely to appeal to lower- and middle-income families than either Coverdell
accounts or QTPs. Still, the statutory drawbacks to these bonds remain
daunting and illogical. The bonds will become a much more attractive
savings device if Congress amends the authorizing statute to remove the
247income limitations altogether. Then, anyone could purchase the bonds, and
as long as the purchaser used them for qualified higher education expenses,
they would remain tax-free.248 Also, Congress should revise the current
restrictive definition of qualified education expense to a more liberal
definition, such as that which currently applies to QTPs and Coverdell
accounts.249 This would make education savings bonds a much more efficient
and equitable savings vehicle.
2. Current Cost Incentives
Both the Ways and Means bill and the Education Consortium advocate
repealing the above-the-line deduction for qualified tuition and related
expenses. 25 Critics note that this remains a confusing deduction with limited
value relative to the other incentives. 1 Both proposals also would repeal the
exemption for dependent students because, as the Consortium noted, it
• . 252
remains the most poorly targeted of all the tax incentives. The Ways and
Means bill further eliminates the penalty relief provision for early
253distributions from IRAs used for the purpose of education , because, as the
247 Congress must also address the asset limitation to qualify for other federal assistance.
While it addressed this to some extent with QTPs, it has not addressed it with savings bonds.
See O'Brien, supra note 234.
248 If Congress eliminated the income limitations, the restrictive age limit on purchase
would become unnecessary. Thus, anyone, including teenagers, would become eligible to
purchase the bonds. This is important for the psychological commitment of taking the first
step toward investing for higher education.
249 This definition covers not only tuition and fees, but also books, supplies, equipment,
special education needs, and, generally, room and board. It also includes elementary and
secondary educational expenses. See I.R.C. §§ 529(e)(3), 530(b)(2)(A).
250 See Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1,1 13th Cong. § 1205 (2014) (proposing to repeal
I.R.C. § 222 along with its corresponding, favorable above-the-line deduction-authorizing
provision under I.R.C. § 62(a)(18)); CONSORTIUM REPORT, supra note 110, at 20-21.
251 See Student Loan Interest Deduction, EDUCATED RISK, http://educatedrisk.org/
analysis/student-loan-interest-deduction.
252 See CONSORTIUM REPORT, supra note 110, at 17-18.
253 Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. § 1210 (2014) (proposing to repeal
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Ways and Means Committee noted, retirement accounts should be used for
retirement.
254
The proposal proffered by this article differs in some important respects
from the current proposals with respect to tax incentives to defray the current
costs of higher education. First, it advocates repealing the education tax
credits. The Ways and Means bill, the Schumer bill, President Obama, and
the Education Consortium all recommend repealing the Lifetime Learning
Credit and substituting a modified AOTC with an enhanced refund feature to
provide greater equity to those in the lower-income levels who may have little
or no tax liability. 255 The refund feature allows them to benefit from the
credit. Still, two problems with these proposals persist. First, in order to claim
the refund, lower-income individuals must file a return when one otherwise
may not have been required. Thus, the proposals involve compliance costs.
Second, there remains a mismatch in timing between the refund and the
tuition payment. 256 The Education Consortium's proposal suggests an
advance or third-party payment of the credit, and the group promises to work
on a timely delivery mechanism .25
In addition, there are other problems with the AOTC that none of the
current proposals is likely to solve. First and foremost, at a cost of over $13
258billion, it remains the largest education tax expenditure. Yet, it has had a
negligible effect on college enrollment, retention, and the type of institution
in which students enroll.259 Since the 2009 amendment to the AOTC under
I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(E) and amending confirming provisions).
254 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 113TH CONG., TAX REFORM ACT OF
2014: DISCUSSION DRAFt, SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY 12 (Comm. Print 2014).
255 See Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. § 1201 (2014) (proposing to amend
I.R.C. § 25A(a), (c), and proposing a new § 25A(b) that would increase the refundable amount
from forty percent to sixty percent (from $1000 to $1500)); American Opportunity Tax Credit
Permanence and Consolidation Act of 2013, S. 835, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013) (proposing a new
I.R.C. § 25A(g)); Press Release, The White House, supra note 169 (seeking to consolidate the
Lifetime Learning Credit into a modified AOTC with an increased refundable portion of
$1500); CONSORTIUM REPORT, supra note 110, at 17, 20 (seeking to repeal the Lifetime
Learning Credit and make the AOTC fully refundable).
256 See Schenk & Grossman, supra note 9, at 353-54; Long, supra note 5, at 132.
257 CONSORTIUM REPORT, supra note 110, at 22-23. See also STEVE HOLT, CTR. FOR
POSTSECONDARY & ECON. SUCCESS, HELP WHEN IT'S NEEDED: ADVANCING THE AOTC 6-7,
15 (2014), http:// www. clasp. org/ resources- and- publications/publication- 1/Help-When-Its-
Needed-Advancing-the-AOTC.pdf.
258 See 2017 BUDGET PERSPECTIVES supra note 25, at 230 tbl.14-1.
259 See NCES DIGEST, supra note 1, at 426 tbl.303.10. Like the effect on tuition increases,
some evidence indicates that the tax incentives may affect both college choice (four-year
versus two-year and private versus public institutions) for students from middle-income
families and the initial decision to pursue post-baccalaureate education. See MICHELLE ASHA
COOPER, COLLEGE ACCESS AND TAX CREDITS, NAT'L Ass'N. OF STUDENT FIN. AID ADM'RS. 8-
10 (2005), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED543302.pdf. Other studies, however, refute this
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the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,26 ° which transformed it into
a partially refundable credit, the bottom twenty percent of households now
receive a greater share of the credit than any other type of tax incentive for
higher education. 26 1 The college enrollment rate by lower-income
individuals, however, has not noticeably increased since 2009.262
All of the proposals to modify the AOTC fail to consider the needs of
current students. The majority of college students today are non-traditional
students. They are older and attend school part-time because they have jobs
263
and families to support. On average, they take over six years to finish
264
college, if they finish at all. Neither the Ways and Means bill nor the
Schumer bill considers these students, because neither bill extends the
eligibility of the AOTC beyond its current four-year period. Even the
President's proposal, which extends the credit to five years,265 does not go far
enough to help these students, and neither does the Consortium's proposal to
substitute the four-year limitation with a lifetime benefit cap of $10,000.266
All of the current proposals eliminate the Lifetime Learning Credit,
which students may use for any year of postsecondary education, meaning
that currently those in graduate or professional school may use this credit.
267
None of the proposals offers any relief to these students. Moreover, the Ways
finding. See Bulman & Hoxby, supra note 27, at 29-30.
Approximately 55% of those who claim the AOTC attend for-profit schools, but few
benefits under the AOTC remain available to those attending community colleges because of
the low cost of these institutions. JASON DELISLE & KIM DANCY, FED. EDUC. BUDGET PROJECT,
NEW AM., A NEW LOOK AT TUITION TAX BENEFITS 11 12 (2015),
https://static.newamerica.org/ attachments/ 10416- a- new- look- at - tuition- tax-benefits/ Tax
Creditsl 1.2.277d3f7daa014d5a86 32090f97641cee.pdf
260 American Recovery and Reinvestment (The Stimulus) Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. I ll-
5, § 1004, 123 Stat. 115,313.
261 See GREER & LEVIN, supra note 9, at 5.
262 NCES DIGEST, supra note 1, at 422 tbl.302.30.
263 See Comments from Terry W. Hartle, Senior Vice-President, Am. Council on Educ.,
to Senate Fin. Comm. Tax Reform Working Grp. on Individual Income Tax (Apr. 14, 2015)
[hereinafter ACE Comments to S. Finance Comm.], http://www.acenet.edu/news-room/
Documents/Comments-Senate-Finance-Committee-lndividual-Income-Tax-Working-Group.
pdf. According to the American Council on Education (ACE), "nearly 50 percent of
undergraduates and three-quarters of all students are adult learners ... ." Id.
264 See id. ("While the median time to degree for all bachelor's degree recipients is 4.3
years, for adult learners (between ages 24-29), the median time to degree is 6.6 years.").
265 See Press Release, The White House, supra note 169.
266 CONSORTIUM REPORT, supra note 110, at 14, 21.
267 The Lifetime Learning Credit, unlike the AOTC, is not limited in the number of years
in which taxpayers may use it. Thus, graduate and professional students may use it. See I.R.C.
§ 25A(c). Since it is a "per taxpayer" credit, however, rather than a "per student" credit, it
remains less advantageous for taxpayers with more than one child in graduate school. Id. at §
25A(c)(1).
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and Means bill reduces the phase-out limits of its modified AOTC, making
268the new credit available to fewer taxpayers. Yet, overall, this bill would
increase spending, reduce revenues, and add to the federal budget deficit. 69
As the dissenting opinion to the bill notes, it makes no sense for Congress to
consolidate these credits at a cost to graduate and professional students,
nontraditional students, and those currently unable to use the AOTC,
benefitting fewer students while adding to the budget deficit.27 °
Another problem with the Ways and Means proposal is that it retains the
AOTC's lifetime ban on use by those convicted of a state or federal felony
drug offense, which the proposal defines as an offense "consisting of the
possession or distribution of a controlled substance" before the end of the
taxable year in which the credit otherwise would apply.271 There are two
problems with this provision. First, it is arbitrary. No similar lifetime ban
exists for other felons, such as rapists, murderers, and thieves. Second, it fails
to take into account the nature of the controlled substance, where it falls
within the controlled substances schedule, how much of the controlled
substance the student possessed, and whether or not this is the student's first
offense. Also, criminal possession laws vary widely from state to state, and
in some cases state law and federal law may vary. For instance, marijuana
remains controversial because it has some medicinal effects, and while
federal law considers it an illegal substance, some states do not criminalize
272its possession or sale. Also, whether the offense constitutes a felony or a
268 The proposal would phase out the modified AOTC between $43,000 and $64,000 for
single filers and between $86,000 and $126,000 for joint filers. H.R. 1 § 1201 (proposed I.R.C.
§ 25A(c)). The current AOTC phases out between $80,000 to $90,000 for single filers and
between $160,000 and $180,000 for joint filers. I.R.C. § 25A(i)(4).
269 See H.R. REP. No. 113-526, at 15 (2014) (stating that staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation estimates that over a 10-year period, the bill would increase direct spending by
approximately $73.7 billion, reduce revenues over this same period by approximately $22.7
billion, and would increase federal budget deficits by approximately $96.5 billion during this
period).
270 See id. at 38 (dissenting views).
271 I.R.C. § 25A(b)(2)(D). This provision appeared in the original legislation and also
appeared in the Aid Elimination Provision of the 1998 reauthorization of the Higher Education
Act. Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 483(f), 112 Stat. 1581, 1736 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §
1091(r)). This provision eliminates federal aid to any student convicted of a drug crime while
receiving federal financial assistance. The ACLU challenged this provision, but the Eighth
Circuit upheld its constitutionality in Students for Sensible Drug Policy Found. v. Spelling,
523 F.3d 896 (8th Cir. 2008).
272 States vary widely in views on marijuana. See generally Marijuana Resource Center:
State Laws Related to Marijuana, WHITE HOUsE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/state-
laws- related-to-marijuana (last visited Nov. 2, 2016). For instance, it is legal to sell, possess,
and use marijuana in Washington, Oregon, Colorado, and Alaska, and in the cities of Portland
and South Portland, Maine, and Keego Harbor, Michigan, and in the District of Columbia
(although Congress currently bans commercial sales in D.C.). See id.; see also State Medical
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misdemeanor may depend on the amount of the substance possessed, which
273
varies from state to state. Further, whether an individual is convicted of a
misdemeanor or a felony drug offense often depends too heavily on the
vagaries of prosecutors and plea-bargains on the one hand, and inadequate
representation on the other hand. Because of these inherent problems,
27Congress should repeal the felony drug conviction ban. 4 Of the four
proposals mentioned, however, only the Consortium's proposal affirmatively
271repeals this provision.
Income limitations also create another problem inherent in the AOTC
and some of the other tax incentives. As mentioned previously, these
limitations are arbitrary and they contain a built-in cliff effect that may reduce
276
or eliminate the benefit. In addition, the definition of mAGI remains a
problem, as it does not allow consideration of certain expenses over which
the taxpayer may have no control but which may affect his or her ability to
pay for higher education, such as extraordinary medical expenses, casualty
losses, and pre-existing student loans. 277 Thus, some taxpayers-considered
higher income under the tax code for purposes of the AOTC phase-out- may
not actually possess the means to afford the cost of higher education. For
Marijuana Laws, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES tbl. 1 (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx#4; Patrick May, Patients May Soon Be
Able to Use Pot at Marin Hospital, Mercury News (Sept. 12, 2016, 2:21 PM), http://www.
mercurynews.com/2016/09/12/patients-may-soon-be-able-to-use-pot-at-marin-hospital/.
There are, however, differences among these states as to the amount that individuals may
legally possess, sell, and grow. In twenty-one states, the possession and use of marijuana is
legal for medicinal use only (e.g., Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island,
and Vermont). See State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra.
273 For instance, in some states, possession of marijuana is merely a civil infraction (e.g.,
Delaware, Connecticut, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island), in others it is a misdemeanor (e.g.,
Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Texas, Wyoming), and in still others it is a felony. See State Laws,
NAT'L ORG. FOR REFORM MARIJUANA LAWS (2016), http://norml.org/laws. Also, in some
states, it is a misdemeanor to sell marijuana (Indiana, Kentucky, and New York), while in
others it is a felony (e.g., Alabama, Florida, Kansas, Tennessee, Texas, Utah). See id.
274 Note that this provision only applies to the Hope Scholarship Credit and the AOTC.
It does not apply to the Lifetime Learning Credit. See I.R.C. § 25A(b)(2)(D), (i).
275 CONSORTIUM REPORT, supra note 110, at 14, 22. One of the other pending House bills,
however, the Student and Family Tax Simplification Act, proposes to repeal the provision. See
H.R. 3393, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014). This bill addresses only the AOTC, Pell Grants, and the
section 222 deduction for qualified tuition and fees. It proposes amendments to the first two
and a repeal of the latter. Id.
276 See Schenk & Grossman, supra note 9, at 325 (noting the arbitrariness of the income
limitations). "A taxpayer with $160,000 of AGI could receive a $2000 deduction for education
expenses, which in a 25% tax bracket would produce tax savings of $500. If, however, he had
$160,001 AGI, he would receive no deduction. Thus, the additional dollar in income produces a
loss of $499." Id. at 301.
277 See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
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instance, a taxpayer with extraordinary medical expenses from long-term
dependent care or extraordinary casualty losses because of a natural disaster,
may have high adjusted gross income but low taxable and disposable income.
Since these deductions are not reflected in adjusted gross income, they do not
affect mAGI. Further, since the deduction for medical expenses is subject to
a high floor,2 7 8 taxable income also may not accurately reflect the taxpayer's
disposable income.
The elimination of the education tax credits would free around $15-$16
billion per year that could be redirected to Pell Grants and subsidized loans.
These direct benefits do not present the timing problems or the inequities of
the tax credits. All of the current proposals address the problem of taxing Pell
Grants used for living expenses, 279 but none address the exclusion of
scholarships and fellowships from income. This exclusion has been in the tax
code since 1954280 and should remain because it is equitable, since most
scholarships and fellowships are granted on the basis of merit and/or need.
The current law excluding scholarships and fellowships from income,
however, provides that the scholarship or fellowship remains tax-exempt
only to the extent the taxpayer uses it for "qualified tuition and related
expenses.,281 This includes tuition and related fees required for college
enrollment or attendance, plus expenses for fees, books, supplies, and
equipment required for course instruction.282
"Qualified tuition and related expenses" does not include expenses for
room and board, which presents three problems. First, room, board, and other
living expenses remain necessary expenses for most students, either because
there is no college within a feasible commuting distance or the most suitable
college is not within a feasible commute. These costs may equal or exceed
the cost of tuition and related fees. The government should allow students the
flexibility to attend the college of their choice. Some scholarships may cover
the cost of living expenses, but if so, the portion used for living expenses
becomes taxable to the student. This means that the scholarship or fellowship
does not inure solely to the benefit of the recipient because the government
283claims a portion as tax. This is neither fair nor efficient. Thus, Congress
278 See I.R.C. § 213. These expenses are first itemized, below-the-line deductions, so
taxpayers may take them only if they have sufficient deductions to itemize, as opposed to
taking the standard deduction. Medical expenses under I.R.C. § 213 also are subject to a floor
of 10% of adjusted gross income, the highest floor of any of the itemized deductions. Id.
§ 213(a). Finally, they may be phased out (reduced) at certain income levels. See id. § 68
(limiting itemized deductions).
279 See supra notes 135-39, 143-144, 160, 170 and accompanying text.
280 See I.R.C. § 117 (1954).
281 I.R.C. § 117(b)(l).
282 Id. § 117(b)(2).
283 Initially, Congress made room and board qualified educational expenses under I.R.C.
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should amend the law to take into account that reasonable living expenses are
a necessary part of higher education for all scholarship and fellowship
recipients, not just Pell Grant recipients.
The second problem is that, as in the case of Pell Grants, to the extent
the student uses a scholarship or fellowship for tuition and related fees, it
reduces the amount of "qualified educational expenses" for purposes of the
284
other education tax incentives. Thus, the amount of those incentives will
be reduced or eliminated for scholarship students and Pell Grant recipients,
while those who receive tax-free gifts neither have to account for the amount
of the gift spent on qualified education expenses, nor reduce the amount of
qualified education expenses for purposes of the tax incentives. Since the
income levels of Pell Grant recipients and familial gift recipients likely varies
widely, this results in disproportionate treatment between the two groups,
285
which is inherently unfair. Thus, the law should alleviate this inequity by
amending the definition of qualified educational expense to cover any
legitimate expense of obtaining a higher education, including living
expenses. Scholarship or fellowship recipients and Pell Grant recipients
could then use their awards for living expenses and also take advantage of
any educational tax incentives in the same manner as students from higher-
income families, whose family members pay their tuition and fees with tax-
free gifts.
A third problem under the current law is that if students use tax-exempt
scholarships or fellowships for eligible education expenses (tuition and fees),
the amount so used may reduce the recipient's eligibility for need-based
286federal student aid. This makes the room and board issue more
pronounced, because students might otherwise spend need-based loans and
grants on room and board.
While the current proposals all advocate solving this problem with
respect to Pell Grants, none suggest extending this "fix" to other scholarship
or fellowship recipients. Spiraling costs, however, make it more and more
difficult for middle-income families to afford higher education. By taxing a
portion of the scholarship or fellowship used to pay legitimate costs of higher
education, the government makes it more difficult for the brightest and/or
§ 117, but in 1986, Congress changed this on the grounds that room, board, and other living
expenses constitute "nondeductible personal expenses." H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 100-01
(1985). As Bittker, McMahon, and Zelenak have noted about the taxation of living expenses
under I.R.C. § 117, "[t]o the extent that the exclusion of tuition scholarships grows out of a
legislative intent to foster the pursuit of education, it is not a very rational way of achieving
this objective." BORIS I. BITrKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 5.06[1] (3d ed. 2002).
284 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
285 See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
286 See supra note 234.
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neediest students to afford higher education. This is both counterproductive
and inefficient.
Prior to 1986, Congress excluded student earnings from income if the
student was required to teach, research, or perform other services as a
condition of receiving the scholarship or fellowship, and the same work was
required of all students as part of their regular course of study, regardless of
287
whether they were scholarship or fellowship recipients. In the base-
broadening quest of the massive 1986 Tax Reform Act, 288however, these
amounts became taxable. 289 Taxing these earnings is shortsighted, though,
because it reduces the value of the scholarship or fellowship. Furthermore,
encouraging students to pay their way to the extent feasible results in less
borrowing for student loans. Therefore, for fairness and efficiency reasons,
Congress should exclude from income the value of work required of students
in order to receive a scholarship, fellowship, or grant.29 °
Currently, "qualified tuition reduction[s]" also remain excluded from
gross income. 29 ' These are tuition reductions that apply to employees of
292
educational institutions and to employees' spouses and dependents. The
Ways and Means bill repeals the exclusion for qualified tuition reductions in
full.293 This article suggests a partial repeal.
While an educational institution has an interest in employees furthering
their education, it has less interest in the employees' spouses and dependents
furthering their education, except as employee incentives. Instead of
287 Treas. Reg. § 1.1 17-2(a)(2) (as amended in 1964).
288 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
289 I.R.C. § 117(c)(1). Congress provided a limited exception for work required under the
National Health Service Corps Scholarship Program and under the Armed Forces Health
Professions Scholarship and Financial Assistance program. Id. § 117(c)(2). These programs
require recipients to perform certain services in the public interest. Recipients of the National
Health Service Scholarship must perform medical services in a geographic area (or to an
underserved population group or designated facility) identified by the Public Health Service
as having a shortage of health care professionals. 42 U.S.C. § 2541 (2002). Armed Forces
Scholarship recipients must serve for a certain number of years in the military at an armed
forces medical facility. 10 U.S.C. § 2122.
290 This would include free or reduced tuition at work/study colleges like Berea College
in Berea, Kentucky, and College of the Ozarks in Point Lookout, Missouri, as well as those
required to perform services (such as teaching) as part of their program of study. See Katy
Hopkins, Save Money by Attending Tuition-Free Colleges, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 12,
2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/paying-for-college/articles/
2012/06/12/save-money-by-attending-tuition-free-colleges (discussing tuition/work exchanges
at Berea College and College of the Ozarks).
291 I.R.C. § I 17(d)(1).
292 Id. § 117(d)(2). This also includes graduate students who work as teaching or research
assistants. Id. § 1 17(d)(5).
293 Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. § 1208 (2014) (proposing to repeal
I.R.C. § 117(d) and amending conforming provisions).
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excluding this provision entirely, the exclusion of tuition reduction for
employees should remain. If an employee's spouse or dependent works
toward a degree, the amount of the tuition reduction should be included in
income, but only for those employees with mAGI above a certain amount.
This will ensure that lower-paid employees will benefit from the exclusion
while higher-paid employees will not. There should be a grandfather
provision, however, to accommodate employees who have children about to
enter college or who are within a few years of entering college. This
accommodation is fair because those employees likely relied upon this
benefit and made career choices and college savings decisions based upon it.
Similarly, Congress should retain the exclusion of tuition reduction for
graduate students who serve as teaching or research assistants because it is
common practice to require graduate students to engage in teaching or
research assistance. If Congress taxed the tuition reduction, these students
would not have the cash flow to pay the tax liability. Thus, as a matter of
basic fairness and efficiency, Congress should enable graduate students to
continue to exclude tuition reductions or waivers.
The Ways and Means bill repeals the exclusion for employer-provided
294educational assistance. This also is shortsighted because this incentive
enables many employees to further their education and obtain critical skills
when they otherwise might not possess the means to do so without a decrease
in their pay.295 If Congress repeals this provision, employer assistance
payments will be considered compensation income, which will subject the
benefit not only to federal income tax, but also to employment taxes,
296
without a corresponding income receipt with which to pay these taxes. This
will likely discourage many employees from taking advantage of employer-
provided educational assistance, unless the employer pays more to
compensate the employee for the tax cost, which will make the program less
attractive to employers. The current exclusion is efficient because it stands to
affect the economy directly and positively by promoting a more educated
workforce, more efficient businesses, and by providing an incentive for third
parties other than the federal government to assume some of the burden of
funding higher education. Congress apparently has been conflicted about this
294 Id. § 1209.
295 See I.R.C. § 127. This exclusion applies to both graduate and undergraduate courses.
Initially, the exclusion did not apply to graduate courses, but Congress changed this in 2001.
See infra note 299.
296 These include not only income tax withholding, but also deductions for the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act (Social Security and Medicare taxes, plus an additional Medicare
tax for income in excess of a threshold amount), as well as unemployment taxes. See
Understanding Employment Taxes, I.R.S. (June 21, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/
small-businesses-self-employed/understanding-employment-taxes.
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benefit for some time. Initially, when it first enacted the provision in 1978,297
it was temporary. Congress then extended it ten times, sometimes at the
eleventh hour, before finally enacting it as a permanent benefit in 2013.298
The temporary nature of this provision had made it difficult for employers
and employees to plan ahead.299
A further problem with this provision is that since Congress enacted it
in 1978, it has not been indexed for inflation. Thus, an employee may exclude
no more than $5250 of employer-provided educational assistance.3 °°
Congress should increase this cap to reflect the cost of education in today's
dollars. While any amount of employer-provided educational assistance
above the current cap might be excludable as a working condition fringe
benefit (provided the expense relates directly to the employee's current
301job), Congress tied the fringe benefit exclusion to the business expense
deduction, which imposes some severe limitations on the deduction of
302
education expenses.
3. After College - Repaying Student Loans
The House Ways and Means Committee, the President, and the
Education Consortium all would repeal the deduction for interest on student
loans because, as President Obama noted, it is complicated, poorly targeted,
and "provides very limited assistance to a broad group of borrowers, rather
than targeting more meaningful assistance to those who need it most.
30 3
297 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 127(d), 92 Stat. 2763, 2813.
298 See Sammer, supra note 86.
299 Also, while the provision currently, and as originally enacted, applies to both
undergraduate and graduate study, Congress had, in the past, twice decided to disallow the
exclusion for graduate study. The first occurred in 1988 when Congress passed the Technical
and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 4001, 102 Stat. 3342, 3643.
Congress reinstated it by passing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-508, § 11403, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-473. The second time Congress removed graduate
course work from the exclusion occurred under the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1202(b), 110 Stat. 1755, 1773. Congress added it back as part of the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 411,115
Stat. 38, 63. That provision was set to expire at the end of 2010. Id. § 901.
300 I.R.C. § 127(a)(2).
301 See id. § 132(a)(3).
302 See id. § 162. For instance, the employee cannot work toward a first degree, the
education cannot qualify the employee for a new trade or business, and the individual must
already work in that trade or business. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (as amended in 1967)
(discussing deductibility of education expenses as business expenses).
303 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT'S
PLAN TO HELP MIDDLE-CLASS AND WORKING FAMILIES GET AHEAD 16-17 (2015), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/middle-class and working-familiestaxrepor
t.pdf. See also Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. § 1204 (2014); CONSORTIUM
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While this deduction is complicated to compute and few taxpayers apparently
use it, an immediate repeal is unfair to those who consistently repay their
loans and claim this deduction, because it would immediately and
unexpectedly increase the cost of their loans. Because of this reliance factor,
Congress should phase out any repeal of this deduction over a period of years
or repeal it only for new loans for undergraduates.3 °4
The interest deduction should remain, however, for graduate and
professional students, who do not enjoy as many federal education incentives
as undergraduates. For instance, graduate and professional students are not
eligible for Pell Grants, do not get the benefit of subsidized Stafford loans,
may not defer the interest on their student loans, so the interest accrues while
they pursue their degrees, and do not get the benefit of the six-month grace
period before repayment when they graduate.3 °5 Since graduate students
generally end up paying more interest over the lives of their loans than their
undergraduate counterparts, the interest deduction should remain for
graduate and professional students.The Ways and Means bill further
recommends repealing the current exclusion for forgiveness of student loans
for students who agree to work in public service occupations or in
underserved geographical areas.30 6 This again is very shortsighted. Those
who work in public service occupations or underserved areas often remain
undercompensated compared to their cohorts working in the private sector
and in urban areas. It is equitable and efficient to exclude such forgiveness
from gross income because it directly serves a public purpose. It provides
some financial parity for those who work in these areas and serves as an
incentive to encourage work in the public interest. Moreover, the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 307 provides that
student loans are no longer dischargeable in bankruptcy, so these debts
remain forever unless the debtor can establish "undue hardship," which is a
308difficult hurdle to clear. A default on student loans also means that Social
REPORT, supra note 110, at 14, 18.
304 The Obama Administration has proposed a repeal of this incentive, but only for new
borrowers. See Press Release, The White House, supra note 169. The Administration also has
proposed expanded income-based repayment options (PAYE), which, if enacted, will
compensate at least somewhat for the loss of the interest deduction. See Lanza, supra note 173
(explaining income based repayment options).
305 See 2014 S.Hrg., supra note 30, at 128-129 (testimony of Dr. Debra W. Stewart,
President, Council of Graduate Schools).
306 Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. § 1207 (2014).
307 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.).
301 Id. § 220(a)(8) (codified at I I U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)). This nondischargeability applies
to both government and private student loans. For problems in meeting the undue hardship
test, see Quixada Moore-Vissing, Inconsistency in Judicial Interpretations of Undue
Hardship, PELL INST. FOR STUDY OPPORTUNITY HIGHER EDUC., http://www.pellinstitute.org/
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Security benefits may be subject to garnishment. 30 9 For an individual working
in the public interest whose salary may be relatively meager, there is much at
stake.
C. Increased Awareness of Benefits
Finally, the federal government could do a better job of increasing
awareness of federal resources for higher education. The federal government
has communicated ineffectively with prospective students about financial aid
and tax incentives,31 ° so that those most in need of these resources may be
311
unaware of them or may not understand them if they are aware. If these
resources were simpler to understand and information about them was more
easily accessible, this alone could increase college enrollment by those in the
target group.
The IRS recently modified its Form 1098-T (Tuition Statement) to
require educational institutions to report the amount of tuition and related
fees that scholarship and fellowship recipients paid, in addition to the
amounts billed. This will enable students to better determine the tax benefits
for which they might be eligible and also will allow the IRS to better monitor
312
compliance. Still, although this modification applies in 2016, its
implementation will lag because the IRS will not impose penalties until 2017
for failure to report the amount paid rather than the amount billed.'
13
Students also lack adequate information about the real cost of college.
Many students do not pay the full sticker price but instead pay a discounted
314price because of need- or merit-based financial assistance. Often, students
do not know at the time of application what price they will have to pay for a
particular institution, much less be able to compare prices among institutions.
downloads/sfarn_2012-Moore-Vissing_061512.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2016).
309 See H. BUDGET COMM., 113TH CONG., EXPANDING OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA,
DISCUSSION DRAFT 46 (July 24, 2014) (citing Annamaria Andriotis, Grandma's New Worry:
Student Debt, MSN MONEY, Aug. 7, 2012).
310 Student financial aid letters do not typically mention the tax benefits that may be
available. See 2014 S.Hrg., supra note 30, at 40 (testimony of Jayne Caflin Fonash, Director
of School Counseling, Loudoun Academy of Science).
311 See, e.g., I.R.S. Pub. 970, Tax Benefits For Education (2016), https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/p970.pdf (explaining the education tax incentives for taxpayers). This publication
currently stands at an eye-glazing ninety-seven pages long.
312 Mark J. Mazur suggested this during the 2014 Senate Hearing. See 2014 S.Hrg., supra
note 28, at 10 (statement of Hon. Mark J. Mazur, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S.
Department of the Treasury).
313 See I.R.S., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 2016 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORMS 1098-E AND
1098-T (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/il098et.pdf (outlining student loan interest
statement and tuition statement).
314 See Tuition Discounts at Private Colleges Continue to Climb, supra note 67.
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This makes it very difficult for students to make informed choices. While the
government has taken steps to address some of these issues,3 15 critics
complain that these steps do not go far enough.
316
D. Feasibility of the Proposal
The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the budgetary impact of
the tax incentives for higher education over four years, from 2015 through
2019, will be $84 billion for the AOTC and Lifetime Learning credits, $24.7
billion for the parental personal exemption for students aged nineteen to
twenty-three, $11.1 billion for the deduction for student loan interest, $5.8
billion for the exclusion of earnings in QTPs, $0.9 billion for the deduction
for tuition and fees, and $0.5 billion for the exclusion of earnings on
Coverdell accounts .31
According to the Obama administration's projections, the cost of free
community college for two years is estimated at around $80 billion over ten
years, which the administration proposes to fund by imposing a tax on higher-
income individuals and financial institutions. 3 18 If one relies on the Joint
Committee's estimate, however, simply eliminating the education tax credits
alone would pay for this benefit in four years. Eliminating the remaining
incentives would save an additional $43 billion, much of which could be
redirected to the Pell Grant program and other direct assistance.
The Joint Committee estimates the current revenue loss from the
exclusion of interest on education savings bonds to be de minimus, defined
as less than $50 million. 319 This amount would be greater under this article's
proposal and probably somewhat similar to the current revenue cost of QTPs
and Coverdells. 320 The exclusions of scholarships and fellowships, tuition
315 See, e.g., College Scorecard, U.S. DEP'T EDUC., http://collegecost.ed.gov/scorecard/.
316 For instance, critics complain that the data lacks sophistication, particularly because
it generally covers only one year and does not cover the full program. Thus, the student lacks
the full picture of what the total cost of the program will be. Critics also complain that the
government's net price calculators are cumbersome to use. See SMOLE, supra note 9, at 3.
317 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., JCX-141R-15, ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX FOR FISCAL YEARS 2015-2019, at 36 tbl. 1 (Comm. Print 2015), https://www.jct.
gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4857. The refund feature of the AOTC for fiscal
years 2015 through 2018 is estimated to cost $29.6 billion. Id. at 41.
318 See Cong. Research Serv., Bill Summary & Status H.R. 2962, 114th Cong. (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/l 14th-congress/house-bill/2962; Stratford, supra note 171
(noting that the President estimated the initial basic cost of the program to be $60 billion,
which the federal government would fund by raising taxes on wealthy Americans and financial
institutions).
319 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., JCX-141R-15, ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX FOR FISCAL YEARS 2015-2019, at 23-24 (Comm. Print 2015).
320 This amount totaled $1.71 billion in 2015. See 2017 BUDGET PERSPECTIVES, supra
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reduction, employer-provided education assistance, and certain discharge of
student loans are projected to cost $23.8 billion over the four-year period
from 2015-2019.321 That amount also would increase under this proposal, but
the amount of that increase remains difficult to project.
V. CONCLUSION
As the American Council on Education stated in its comments to the
Senate Finance Committee, "[b]ecause the opportunity to reform these
provisions does not come along very often, it is critically important that any
reforms address the needs and circumstances of the broad range of students
in higher education." 322 It is also critical that Congress undertakes the reform
with a goal of increasing college enrollment and retention, especially for
minorities, first generation college students, and the economically
disadvantaged.
The proposal proffered by this article primarily addresses reform of the
education tax incentives, but meaningful reform must address all aspects of
federal funding for higher education. This proposal shares some features in
common with the current proposals, but it also differs significantly. Like the
comprehensive Ways and Means bill, this proposal would repeal Coverdell
accounts, the Lifetime Learning Credit, the deduction for qualified tuition
and related fees, the exemption for students aged eighteen to twenty-four, and
the ten percent penalty for early withdrawals from retirement accounts.
Like the President's proposal, this one would tax interest accumulation
on new contributions to QTPs, essentially eliminating the tax benefit of that
tax-favored college savings device. Unlike any of the current proposals,
however, this one would greatly expand the benefits of educational savings
bonds to make them a more important college savings incentive. This would
allow greater participation by individuals in lower-income levels and
encourage them to make the important psychological commitment to save
toward a better future for their children.
Unlike any of the current proposals, this one would repeal the AOTC
because it remains expensive and ineffective. The proposal would make
modifications to the exclusion from tax of scholarships, fellowships, and
tuition reductions in order to make the tax treatment of those incentives fairer
and more consistent with the goal of encouraging greater college enrollment
and retention by the economically and socially disadvantaged. This also
should result in less student debt in the long run. The proposal also would
note 25, at 210 tbl.14-1. See also GREER & LEVIN, supra note 9.
321 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., JCX-141R-15, ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX FOR FISCAL YEARS 2015-2019, at 36 tbl.1 (Comm. Print 2015).
322 ACE Comments to S. Finance Comm., supra note 263, at 4.
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expand the exclusion of employer-provided educational assistance and
gradually phase out the student loan interest deduction. The remaining six tax
323incentives would be retained without change.
The elimination of some of the tax incentives and the modification of
others should result in a significant revenue savings that can be redirected to
make federal spending for higher education much more efficient. This can be
done by increasing the amount of Pell Grants so that they become more
meaningful and by providing free community college, as the President has
proposed. Both of these would result in less borrowing for college and less
student debt in the long run. It could help control some of the costs of higher
education, at least in the short term, by reducing some of the regulatory
324burden on educational institutions.
Inadequate funding for education and poor funding policies create a
vicious circle in which the opportunity costs of higher education seem
overwhelming for many low- and middle-income individuals, so they either
do not enroll or they drop out, student borrowers find it difficult to repay their
loans, and the economy suffers. The federal government's expenditure for
higher education remains inefficient because it is too high compared to the
benefit that it receives, especially with respect to the tax incentives. The
current system, which requires students to commit a large portion of their
future income to obtain an education, remains counterproductive because it
eradicates the positive externalities of higher education and undermines not
only the federal investment in education, but the entire American dream.
The problem of funding education remains an enormous and
multifaceted one. This article has addressed only the federal financial
commitment to higher education. In order to reach the desired goal of equal
educational opportunities for all and to generate the maximum positive
external benefits, improvements must be made in every level of education.
Further, the states must assume their proper role in funding education. The
federal government also has an important role, however, because it has
undertaken the funding of education, and if it does not continue this role in a
thoughtful manner, the results could be dire. On the other hand, if done
323 These are (1) the deduction for education expenses related to current employment
under I.R.C. § 162; (2) the corresponding exclusion for education expenses paid by an
employer that do not fall under § 127, but may be considered a working condition fringe
benefit under § 132(a)(3); (3) the definition of "qualifying child" for purposes of the earned
income credit, which includes a student under age twenty-four, § 32(c)(3)(A) &
§ 152(c)(3)(A); (4) the exclusion for loan forgiveness for those working in the public interest
under § 108(0; (5) the exclusion from gift tax of payments of tuition and related fees made
directly to an educational institution under § 2503; and (6) the exclusion of educational
assistance to members of the military under § 134. See supra note 23.
324 See H. Oversight Hrg., supra note 53, at 6 (statement of Terry W. Hartle, Senior Vice
President, American Council on Education); supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
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properly, this investment could pay tremendous dividends to the country for
many years to come.
The current education tax incentives do not work well and their cost
remains high. It is important that Congress not squander this opportunity to
reform these incentives. It is time for drastic reform of the incentives,
reinvesting the revenue savings from that reform in education through direct
funding. For this to occur, however, the federal government needs a steady
commitment to education and a clear, workable goal.

